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THE CONCEITS OF OUR
LEGAL IMAGINATION: LEGAL
 FICTIONS AND THE CONCEPT OF
DEEMED AUTHORSHIP
Alina Ng Boyte*
Legal fictions contain embedded nuggets of information about social
reality and reveal important aspects of human society. However, the use of
legal fictions may also obscure important information or fundamental ques-
tions about law and its role in shaping society. These fictions become insti-
tutionalized without a clear understanding of their function. When that
happens, fallacious assumptions about human behavior and social relation-
ships transform into binding principles that set the course for future legal
development, potentially resulting in legal rules that are completely dissoci-
ated from social, historical, or cultural reality. This article explores the
concept of deemed authorship as a legal fiction in copyright law and de-
scribes how this fiction both obscures fundamental notions about authorship
and creativity and complicates copyright jurisprudence, preventing our con-
sideration of the proper legal questions about creativity and its impact on
the progress of science. This article argues that the institutionalization of
this legal fiction separates an author from the defining attributes of per-
sonhood and contradicts our basic understanding about human creativity.
As the fiction of deemed authorship inaccurately depicts the role of cre-
ators, it isolates rather than socializes legal language. Since this and other
fictions that contradict our experiences of reality may cause more harm
than benefit to our understanding of the law, they must be used with caution
so that legal rules that are more consistent with institutional aspirations,
individual and communal expectations, and the rule of law can develop.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal fictions propagate so many untruths in the practice of law
that Jeremy Bentham once quipped that in English law, a “fiction is a
syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into every part of the
system, the principle of rottenness.”1 Fraudulent as they may be,
“these conceits of the legal imagination”2 are actually important nug-
gets of information about our society embedded in the law. Saying
that legal fictions contain information about social reality may sound
oxymoronic, but this description is not as contradictory as one may
initially think. These metaphors used by courts or the legislature to
attain justice,3 set bright line rules,4 or establish normative standards5
also reveal distinct characteristics about the society in which we live.
The glaring contrast between a fact and its corresponding legal fiction
should be incisive in showing that legal rules are often limited in their
capacity to address the realities of human interaction. Legal fictions
prove indispensable in connecting the law’s familiar experiences and
its conventional knowledge with these unanticipated human events to
attain an outcome that is most congruent with what society under-
stands its legal system to be.
Yet, casual uses of fictions may defeat their very reasons for ex-
istence. When used without a clear understanding of their purpose,
legal fictions can transform metaphors about social behavior and
1. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF PACKING: AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JU-
RIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW 62 (1821).
2. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 1 (1967).
3. See, e.g., Porter v. Earthman, 12 Tenn. 358, 367 (1833) (Opinion of Catron,
C.J.) (stating that the legal fiction that judgments in favor of different lien holders
were all made on the first date of the term in which the judgment was rendered irre-
spective of when the judgment was actually rendered “was adopted to attain the ends
of justice.”).
4. For example, a child is treated as an adult when he reaches the age of majority;
this is a legal fiction that creates a bright line rule because in reality, “children do not
magically become adults when they turn eighteen.” See Seema K. Shah & Franklin G.
Miller, Can We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions in the Determination of Death, 36
AM. J.L. & MED. 540, 560 (2010).
5. Jeanne M. Woods, Justiciable Social Rights as a Critique of the Liberal Para-
digm, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 763, 768 n.30 (2003).
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human truths into binding legal principles that set the trajectory of
legal development in stone—all inconspicuously and without our real-
ization.6 This becomes especially troubling since fundamental ques-
tions about human ontology can never come to light when they remain
shrouded by a cloak of falsity. We may miss seeing truly important
questions due to our single-minded concentration on a practical—but
untrue—fiction. Law can be powerfully conceptualized as a type of
human language, clearly communicating the desires of legal institu-
tions to members of their society.7 Legal fictions play the important
role of providing analogies, metaphors, and categories to help us find
meaning in—and hopefully understand—the language of the law.8
We should thus be vigilant in the use of legal fictions in order to avoid
thinking that they convey truths about society or individuals.
This article explores the legal fiction of deemed authorship, a le-
gal doctrine that bestows copyright protections on an entity other than
the work’s true creator. Contemporary copyright jurisprudence treats
deemed authorship as an institutionalized norm.9 Unless we remember
why this fiction is used, it is impossible to address some of the more
fundamental questions about human creativity and the act of author-
ship. This article argues that the institutionalization of this legal fiction
alienates the work’s creator from the defining attributes of authorship
and personhood. As a result, it contradicts our basic understanding of
authors and their creative processes. The fiction of deemed authorship
is so well integrated into copyright law that its primary purpose as
support for legal reasoning has faded into the backdrop of the law’s
tapestry. It is now taken as representing certain truths about our soci-
ety despite its inaccurate representation of human authors and their
creative undertakings. This particular conceit of our legal imagination
has obscured—not revealed—the truth about human authorship.
6. See Note, Lessons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in
the Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2232–33 (2002).
7. John R. Searle, What is language: some preliminary remarks, in JOHN
SEARLE’S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: FORCE, MEANING AND MIND 15, 43 (Savas L.
Tsohatzidis ed., 2007) (describing human language to represent and create “a deontol-
ogy of rights, duties, commitments [that] can be extended to create a social and insti-
tutional reality”).
8. See BENJAMIN K. BERGEN, LOUDER THAN WORDS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HOW
THE MIND MAKES MEANING 3–5 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543 (E.D. La. 1999)
(describing a work-made-for-hire situation, wherein an employer is deemed the author
of the employee’s work, and where the law treats the issue as “one of authorship and
not of transfer of rights; the employer is presumed to be the author initially and not by
virtue of a post-creation transfer.”).
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In Part I of this paper, I discuss the role of legal fictions. Specifi-
cally, I describe the function of legal fictions in attaining justice, creat-
ing certainty, and establishing standards in the law, recognizing that
these are important functions in facilitating legal thought about diffi-
cult and untried social issues. The use of fictions in the law—as in
many other disciplines10—helps develop our limited understanding of
the world and clearly lays out the reason for particular legal rules,
engendering social respect for clear, sound laws.11 When the law is
well constructed, a more productive society is created. Instead of so-
cializing legal language, however, some legal fictions dissociate the
law from social and moral norms because they institutionalize false
ideas that lead to incorrect—and sometimes immoral—legal conclu-
sions. When these legal fictions are used without a clear understanding
that they are false and are meant to facilitate legal thought, they pre-
vent us from seeing more important issues, pursuing answers to diffi-
cult questions, and developing a fuller understanding of the law
because of their illustrious and beneficent facade.
Part II turns to the concept of deemed authorship. It classifies this
concept as a troublesome fiction that blurs the distinction between the
reality of human creativity and the falsity of imputed authorship. The
work-for-hire doctrine in copyright is the quintessential embodiment
of deemed authorship and it allocates initial authorship and ownership
of a work with the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared.12 This doctrine is troublesome because it imputes authorship
on an entity other than the actual creator of the work and divests the
actual creator of his identity as the true author—an identity essential
10. See HANS VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ‘AS IF’: A SYSTEM OF THE THEO-
RETICAL, PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND 3 (C.K. Ogden trans., 6th
ed. 1924).
11. A basic objective in legal philosophy is the study of law and legal systems and
the authority of human language to demand individual obedience to particular codes
of conduct. For natural lawyers, human laws expressed in human language are capable
of demanding obedience because they are manifestations of divine will. More secular-
ized theories of law, such as analytical jurisprudence, theorize that human language
commands obedience and creates order because certain social conditions exist to sup-
port the law’s authority. See Randall E. Auxier, Order, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 619, 620 (Christopher Gray ed., 2000). Unless the will of the
lawmaker is communicated in language that makes sense to those it binds and be-
comes, in that respect, socialized, laws cannot have binding authority because they
cannot be understood by their subjects.
12. The Copyright Act provides that “[i]n the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author
for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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to personhood.13 Divesting the true creator of his identity as the author
and imputing that identity to someone else as if that identity were
alienable violates human dignity and the creator’s ability to flourish.14
However, this point may be obscured by the efficiency of the work-
for-hire doctrine as a legal rule in the copyright system.15 Though
13. See MARGARET J. RADIN, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957
(1982). The idea of personhood in Professor Radin’s work is encapsulated as a moral
ideal that an individual can only achieve proper self-development and become a com-
plete person when he is able to control resources in his external environment. Some of
these external resources are personal and inextricably bound to the individual for
whom its loss would cause pain. Radin argues that the law should provide greater
protection to property claims over such resources where they are personal to the indi-
vidual and constitute part of his personhood. In this light, creative expressions may
also be subject to property rights by virtue of their creation, but the author’s identity
as the true author of the work—while not the subject of property—is even more
personal to the author than the work itself, and thus, the author’s identity should be
protected by a rule against divestment. Since authorship draws so much from the
author’s identity—which we may think of as his “history and future” and “life and
growth” that he poured into the work—the law should protect a creator’s identity as
the true author with a strict property-type rule. Id. at 992.
14. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1879–81 (1987). Professor Radin developed a theory of market inalienability and ar-
gued that some market discourses are harmful to personhood. Personal attributes such
as bodily integrity are not fungible objects that can “pass in and out of the person’s
possession without effect on the person.” Id. at 1880. Such attributes cannot be com-
modified and alienated because they are essential to the ideal of personhood). I argue
in this paper that authorship is an attribute personal to the author. As author, identity
as creator connotes that a person invested labor, imagination, personality, and individ-
ual experience to create an authentic work, this identity is essential to how one per-
ceives himself as a person.
15. The work-for-hire doctrine served an important role when it emerged in copy-
right jurisprudence. It helped courts reconcile individual creativity with the rise of
corporate America and the inevitable pressure to allocate initial ownership of the work
in a corporate employer as a matter of economic exigency. See Oren Bracha, The
Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early
American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 260 (2008) (justifying corporate ownership
of the intellectual labor of employees in the second half of the nineteenth century as
“part of a general move in the period’s legal thinking—a move to adjust traditional
legal doctrines and categories to the new environment of corporate liberalism.”); R.H.
COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33, 38–40
(1988). In his theory of the firm, Ronald Coase pointed out that firms exist mainly
because it is sometimes costly to depend on prices to coordinate market activity. One
of the costs of using prices to negotiate transfer of resources is the cost of negotiating
and entering numerous individualized contracts along one production line. When one
works with a firm, this is no longer necessary; one only enters in to a single contract
with the firm, “[f]or this series of contracts is a substituted one.” Id. at 39. The work-
for-hire doctrine allowed authorial rights stemming from multiple creators in the pro-
duction of a work, such as a cinematographic work, to be consolidated in the em-
ployer of these individual talents such as a movie studio. See United States Copyright
Office and Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 134
(2000) (prepared statement of Paul Goldstein, Professor, Stanford Law School).
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deemed authorship may be a necessary and expedient legal fiction, its
use should not obscure more fundamental questions about the author,
the notion of authorship, and the goal of scientific progress through
copyright. We should not forget that these pressing questions exist
simply because a legal fiction hints that they do not.
I.
LEGAL FICTIONS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY
A. How Legal Fictions Work
Fictions abound throughout the law. When successful, these fic-
tions typically serve one of three purposes: to promote fairness, in-
crease efficiency, or provide a standard against which litigants’
behavior may be evaluated.
Common-law courts have traditionally used legal fictions to
serve justice when the strict application of the law produced unfair
results.16 For instance, consider the case of Mrs. Evans, a 79-year-old
widow at the heart of the seminal British case Binions v. Evans.17
When her husband died, the property owners for whom he worked
promised Mrs. Evans (whose first name was not reported) that she
would be able to live on the same property that her husband—and
several generations before him—had lived and worked on until death.
But the Evans did not own the property—they lived on it as caretakers
in a cottage provided at the will of their employers, the owners of the
Estate. The Estate had promised Mr. Evans that he could live in the
cottage for as long as he worked there and, furthermore, that Mrs.
Evans could remain after he died. Shortly after Mr. Evans passed, the
property was purchased by Mr. and Mrs. Binions, who, despite buying
the property with actual knowledge of the Estate’s promise to Mrs.
Evans, unexpectedly served notice on Mrs. Evans to leave the prop-
erty even as she was tending to it after her husband’s death. Since
Mrs. Evans had a mere promise (in the form of a contractual license
instead of a property right such as a lease) to occupy the property,
16. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 596 (1960) (“fictions were often expedients to
further the end of justice.”). Sir William Blackstone, writing in his Commentaries,
saw the “proper operation” of legal fictions as “being to prevent a mischief, or remedy
an inconvenience, that might result from the general rule of law.” WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS *43. See also
Sidney T. Miller, The Reasons for Some Legal Fictions, 8 MICH. L. REV. 623, 623
(1910) (defining a legal fiction as a “legal assumption that something is true, which is,
or may be, false—being an assumption of an innocent and beneficial character, made
to advance the interests of justice.”).
17. Binions v. Evans, [1972] Ch. 359 (Wales).
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precedent indicated she should vacate the property upon the request of
its new owners.18
Under traditional legal principles, Mrs. Evans, as a mere licensee,
would have had to vacate the property once she was asked to leave.
Yet the Court of Appeal decided for Mrs. Evans because Mr. and Mrs.
Binions’ purchase contract expressly subjected them to Mrs. Evans’
occupancy and, thus, they bought the property with actual knowledge
of the Estate’s promise to Mrs. Evans. Mr. and Mrs. Binions even paid
less for the property than they otherwise would have if they had
bought the property without Mrs. Evans’ license.19 To reach what it
saw as an equitable outcome for Mrs. Evans, the court here used the
fiction of the constructive trust to make the new property owners con-
structive trustees of Mrs. Evans’ beneficial interest.
The court’s reliance on the fiction of constructive trust in Binions
v. Evans served a moral purpose and furthered the interest of justice.
As a constructive trust can be imposed in invitum or against the will of
the parties, it is an exception to the traditional rule that trusts of real
property must be created in writing or otherwise represent the parties’
presumed intention.20 In both express and resulting trusts, a fiduciary
relationship may be established from the real or presumed intention of
the parties to create a trust. The trust acknowledged by the courts in
both cases of express and resulting trusts is overtly or impliedly cre-
ated by the parties.21 Constructive trusts, on the other hand, are not the
product of the parties’ intention; rather, they are fictional artifacts used
by the courts to achieve an equitable result. As Lord Denning M.R.
stated in Binion v. Evans, the constructive trust was imposed simply
18. See King v. David Allen & Sons Billposting Ltd., [1916] 2 A.C. 54 (H.L.), 61
(appeal taken from Ir.) (“[The] contract between the appellant and the respondents . . .
creates nothing but a personal obligation. It is a license given for good and valuable
consideration and to endure for a certain time. But . . . there is [no] authority for
saying that any such document creates rights. . . . [Arising from a] relationship of
landlord and tenant or grantor and grantee . . . it [cannot] be reasonably urged that
anything beyond personal rights was ever contemplated by the parties.”); see also
Binions, [1972] Ch. at 367 (stating that Mrs. Evans had “a license, and no tenancy. It
is a privilege which is personal to her. . . . [The promise to Mrs. Evans] ranks as a
contractual [license] and not a tenancy.”).
19. Binions, [1972] Ch. at 365.
20. George P. Costigan, Jr., The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting, and
Constructive, 27 HARV. L. REV. 437, 446–47 (1914) (exemplifying the principle that
trusts may not be in writing but “result” from the circumstances of a case and pre-
sumed intention of the parties, such as when the incomplete transfer of a beneficial
interest produces part of an estate that has no takers and a reversionary interest is
implied back to the grantor).
21. Id. at 448 (“Express trusts and resulting trusts are trusts by the real or the pre-
sumed intention of the parties. . . .”).
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because it was inequitable for Mr. and Mrs. Evans to turn Mrs. Evans
out:
Suppose, however, that the defendant did not have an equitable in-
terest at the outset, nevertheless it is quite plain that she obtained
one afterwards when the Tredegar Estate sold the cottage. They
stipulated with the plaintiffs that they were to take the house “sub-
ject to” the defendant’s rights under the agreement. They supplied
the plaintiffs with a copy of the contract: and the plaintiffs paid less
because of her right to stay there. In these circumstances, this court
will impose on the plaintiffs a constructive trust for her benefit: for
the simple reason that it would be utterly inequitable for the plain-
tiffs to turn the defendant out contrary to the stipulation subject to
which they took the premises . . . This imposing of a constructive
trust is entirely in accord with the precepts of equity.22
Lord Denning’s broad application of the constructive trust to situ-
ations where one party acts inequitably to harm another has not been
widely adopted in English law.23 However, the fiction of the construc-
tive trust has been widely adopted in the United States to provide rem-
edies when one party benefits unfairly at the expense of another. The
constructive trust is not only used by U.S. courts as a shield to protect
innocent parties,24 but is also commonly used as a sword in restitution
claims against a party who has unjustly profited through wrongdo-
ing.25 The constructive trust is thus a “device used by equity to compel
one who unfairly holds a property interest to convey the same to an-
other to whom it justly belongs.”26 While constructive trusts function
to prevent actions by legal title holders of property that deprive its true
22. Binions, [1972] Ch. at 368 (emphasis added).
23. SARAH WILSON, TODD AND WILSON’S TEXTBOOK ON TRUST 261 (2007).
24. See, e.g., Dominick v. Rhodes, 24 S.E.2d 168, 172–73 (1943) (the court im-
posed a constructive trust on a father who took his son’s property and treated the
property as his own, stating that an express or conventional trust relationship between
the parties was not necessary for the courts to impose a constructive trust if “the
circumstances under which property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be
retained by him who holds the legal title, as against another, provided some confiden-
tial relation exists between the two, and provided the raising of a trust is necessary to
prevent a failure of justice”; the court went on to state that “the forms and varieties of
constructive trusts are practically without limit, such trusts being raised, broadly
speaking, whenever necessary to prevent injustice.”) (emphasis removed from
original).
25. American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So. 2d 1053, 1058–59 (Ala. 1990)
(“A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of
the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts
him into a trustee.”) (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378,
380 (N.Y. 1919)).
26. Schaffer v. Schaffer, 183 N.Y.S.2d 882, 882 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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beneficiaries of their expected gains, they also allow courts to achieve
fairer decisions in specific cases where the desired outcome is irrecon-
cilable with the applicable legal rule. The constructive trust bridges
aspired legal outcomes, such as just results, with a more fundamental
goal in law—that free, willing, and able parties to a given transaction
conduct themselves in good faith.27
Legal fictions are not only used to achieve justice when legal
rules are harsh. At times, they have also been used to simplify laws
and create bright-line rules to ease their application. For instance, a
number of legal fictions have been created to ease application of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. The Rule Against Perpetuities invalidates
contingent future interests in wills and estates that are too remote,
such as when a testator grants property to a person with conditions
that can only be satisfied after the defined perpetuities period.28 This
rule ensures the free alienability of property. It was historically
adopted to support the development of a mercantile middle class by
ensuring that property entered “the stream of commerce” and did not
stay within the landowner’s control.29 But even if the historical ratio-
nale for the rule has become obsolete, other contemporary rationales
for the rule exist, such as to strike a fair balance between property
rights of present and future generations, advance the socially desirable
policy that property be freely circulating among the living, and limit
the control of property by those who have died.30
A variety of legal fictions—some bordering on absurdity—were
adopted to support the Rule Against Perpetuities and void gifts of
27. See, e.g., Cenac v. Murry, 609 So. 2d 1257, 1272 (Miss. 1992) (“All contracts
contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in performance and en-
forcement.”); Wilson v. Amereda Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1126 (N.J. 2001) (“A
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract in New Jersey.”);
Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1077 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
(“The guiding principle in the application of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing emanates from the fundamental notion that a party to a contract may not
unreasonably frustrate its purpose.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
28. The classical articulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities is provided by Profes-
sor John Chipman Gray: “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (ROLAND GRAY ED., 4TH ED.
1942), quoted in THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 573 (2nd. ed. 2012).
29. Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 708
(1955).
30. Id. at 709–10. See also George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead
Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
19, 20 (1977).
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property vesting too remotely. These fictions supported the general
legal and economic notion that property would only be valuable when
it was in free and active circulation.31 Legal fictions of the “fertile
octogenarian,” the “unborn widow,” and the “precocious toddlers”
serve to invalidate gifts that could potentially vest in individuals at
least 21 years after the death of any person alive when the interest was
created. These fictions allowed courts to presume that the fertile octo-
genarian or precocious toddler could have a child eligible to take the
gift after the perpetuities period.32 Although these fictions may be pre-
posterous—especially in light of medical and physiological realities of
the time33—their bright-line assumptions provided legal certainty by
eliminating the need for medical testimony on a person’s ability to
father or bear a child.34 The conclusive presumption that a person may
have a child throughout his or her lifetime frees the law from depend-
ing on professional claims to make determinations about the validity
of posthumous gifts. Professional mistakes sometimes happen,35 and
adducing medical evidence of infertility, as Professor Leach pointed
out, may be difficult.36
31. See Maiben v. Bobe, 6 Fla. 381, 398 (1855).
32. Under the Rule Against Perpetuities, all future interest (particularly contingent
remainders and executory interests) must vest within twenty-one years after the death
of a life-in-being living at the time the interest is created. The rule works on the
assumption that a person is fertile from the time of birth right until death. Hence an
interest will fail if there is the possibility that a two-year old boy or an eighty-year-old
woman might bear a child after the perpetuities period. An interest would also fail if it
is given to someone who might marry a woman yet to be born at the creation of the
interest. For a discussion of the fertile octogenarian and the unborn widow, see W.
Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 643–44 (1938).
Professor Leach envisions a case involving a “precocious toddler” inadvertently aris-
ing by a drafting mistake since the presumption of fertility regardless of age and
physical condition appears to be firmly established in the law. For this discussion, see
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 721, 731–32 (1952).
33. It should be noted that the possibility of a toddler or an octogenarian having a
child is no longer a hypothetical in this age. In fact, science and medicine have ad-
vanced to a point where these theoretical possibilities have become factually plausi-
ble. See Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Moriss, Birth after Death: Perpetuities and
the New Reproductive Technologies, 38 GA. L. REV. 575, 592 (2004) (describing
scenarios where pregnancies, or reproductions, could occur among infants and
octogenarians through new reproductive technologies); see also DUKEMINIER, ET AL.
247 n.22 (2014) (discussing a woman who gave birth to twins at 67 years of age and a
young girl who gave birth to a baby boy at the age of 5).
34. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: New Hampshire Defertilizes the Octogenarians,
77 HARV. L. REV. 279, 281–83 (1963).
35. Id. at 281–82.
36. Id. at 282–83.
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Such conclusive presumptions, while fictional, are efficient and
achieve certainty in the law. To take another example, the fiction of
corporate personhood creates a legal entity with its own powers and
rights as well as duties and liabilities. It allows the corporation to exist
independently of its shareholders and directors as a separate legal per-
son.37 The formation of the modern corporation allowed shareholder
ownership of the corporation’s business to be separated from execu-
tive management of the corporation’s affairs, and allowed corporate
resources to be used more efficiently.38 Moreover, a single corporation
that vertically integrated its production and marketing functions would
be able to reduce business expenses through the internalization of pre-
viously external market transactions.39 The fiction of corporate per-
sonhood provides a number of advantages to achieve an efficient
market. It supports the integration of corporate functions while sepa-
rating members of the corporation from the corporation’s legal
identity.
In addition to promoting fairness and efficiency, legal fictions
also set normative standards against which social activity can be eval-
uated. For instance, the hypothetical “reasonable man” in tort and
criminal law is used to establish standards for reasonable conduct that
individuals are expected to meet. The normative standard established
by the care the hypothetical reasonable man is expected to take would
be a standard of “ordinary care,” which “the great mass of mankind
would ordinarily exercise” under similar circumstances.40 In patent
law, the “person skilled in the art” establishes the baseline for inven-
tiveness before an invention will be considered sufficiently inventive
to justify the grant of a monopoly over the invention for twenty
years.41 The “person skilled in the art,” like other hypothetical individ-
37. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 667–68 (1819) (a corpora-
tion is “an artificial person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with cer-
tain powers and franchises which, though they must be exercised through the medium
of its natural members, are yet considered as subsisting in the corporation itself, as
distinctly as if it were a real personage. Hence, such a corporation may sue and be
sued by its own members; and may contract with them in the same manner as with
any strangers.”).
38. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought,
76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1681–82 (1988).
39. See Coase, supra note 15, at 37–40.
40. Osborne v. Montgomery, 234 N.W. 372, 375–76 (Wis. 1931).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2013) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained
. . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date
of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
claimed invention pertains.”). See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (setting the patent term
as twenty years from the date on which the patent was filed).
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uals used to establish acceptable standards of conduct, requires the
court to revert to the point the invention was made and determine
whether the hypothetical person would have seen the invention as ob-
vious.42 The fictional attributes of the person skilled in the art, how-
ever, make it difficult to accurately determine his cognitive abilities,43
and scholars more generally have criticized the reasonable person
standard as being susceptible to circular reasoning.44 Despite these
shortcomings, the fiction of the hypothetical reasonable man remains a
useful normative measure that allows courts to reconcile the conflict-
ing social interests of a legal actor with those of the society as a
whole.45
Legal scholars have generally been ambivalent and indecisive
about the value of legal fictions. The few scholars who have written
about fictions in the law have reached opposing conclusions about le-
gal fictions and their virtue. The more visceral criticism against legal
fictions have been advanced based on a committed belief to the princi-
ple of legislative supremacy—the principle that the ultimate law-mak-
ing authority lies with the legislature instead of the judicial or
executive branches.46 To Jeremy Bentham, legal fictions allow the ju-
diciary to surreptitiously usurp legislative authority and are objection-
able because of their subservience to the judiciary’s “sinister interest”
in seizing legislative authority.47 As “removable creatures” of the
monarchy, Bentham thought that the judiciary would systematically
carry out the monarchy’s desire for “depredation and oppression” in
an indirect and inconspicuous way through the pretenses of legal
fictions.48
Roscoe Pound furthered the view that legal fictions can be used
by judges to legislate “under guise of interpretation.”49 According to
Pound, legal fictions are used to advance “[s]purious interpretation”
that is intended “to make, unmake, or remake, and not merely to dis-
cover” legislative intent.50 Though useful in the formative period of
42. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
43. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Pat-
entability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1604 (2011).
44. See id. at 1605–06.
45. PETER M. GERHART, TORT AND SOCIAL MORALITY 25 (2010).
46. T.R.S. ALLAN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: FREEDOM, CONSTITUTION AND COM-
MON LAW 168 (2013).
47. JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in COL-
LECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 502, 503 (J. H. Burns, H.L.A. Hart & Phillip
Schofield eds., 2008).
48. Id. at 510.
49. Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907).
50. Id. at 382.
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the common law, Pound felt that spurious interpretation is an “anach-
ronism in an age of legislation.”51 More recently, Professor Peter J.
Smith argued that “even in the age of positive law,” judges “fashion
new legal rules.”52 Instead of using factual assertions that are obvi-
ously false as with classical legal fictions, judges today offer an “os-
tensibly factual supposition as a ground for creating a legal rule or
modifying, or refusing to modify, an existing legal rule.”53 This fac-
tual supposition is descriptively inaccurate and works as a new legal
fiction to support “the court’s normative choice among competing
possible legal rules.”54 Although Smith does not have the same dis-
taste for judicial law-making as did Bentham and Pound, he asks for
more judicial transparency as courts make normative choices.
Other scholars—such as John Austin, John Chipman Gray, and
Lon Fuller—have been much less critical of legal fictions. These
scholars did not see judicial use of legal fictions as an attempt by
courts to deceive the public and usurp legislative authority. Instead,
they viewed legal fictions as tools of legal reasoning that helped the
courts reach more consistent legal decisions. John Austin, a disciple of
Bentham,55 believed that legal fictions are not as dangerous as his
teacher described. Rather, Austin considered the theory that legal fic-
tions are deceptive to be “ridiculous”56 and thought it unlikely that
“the authors of such innovations had the purpose of introducing them
covertly.”57 Instead, he saw fictions as innocent means by which
judges and lawyers preserved ancient rules in modern society.58
John Chipman Gray, though critical of fictions that add “new law
to old without changing the form of the old law,”59 was more recep-
tive to fictions that “arrange recognized and established doctrines
under the most convenient forms.”60 Quoting Sir Henry Maine from
his book, Ancient Law, Gray stated that historical fictions are “scaf-
51. Id. at 383.
52. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2006).
53. Id. at 1441.
54. Id.
55. W.L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN 1 (1982).
56. JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE
LAW 308 (Robert Campbell, ed., Jersey City, Henry Holt & Co., student’s ed. 1875)
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 30 (1921).
These fictions were termed “historical fictions.” Gray relied on Ihering’s classification
of legal fictions into historical and dogmatic fictions in his writing and used Ihering’s
(also known Jhering) classification to object to prolonged use of the historical fiction
and welcome use of the dogmatic fiction. See id. at 30–37.
60. Id. at 36. These fictions were termed “dogmatic fictions” according to Ihering’s
classification. Id.
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folding—useful, almost necessary, in construction—but, after the
building is erected, serving only to obscure it.”61 These historical fic-
tions, however, Gray thought that were
compatible with the most refined and most highly developed sys-
tems of Law. Instead of being blameworthy, they are to be praised
when skillfully and wisely used. . . . They should never be used, as
the historic fictions were used, to change the Law, but only for the
purpose of classifying established rules, and one should always be
ready to recognize that the fictions are fictions, and be able to state
the real doctrine for which they stand.62
Lon Fuller would likely agree with Gray’s support for carefully
used legal fictions to clarify legal rules. In fact, Fuller appears to have
the most tolerance for legal fictions among scholars who have written
on the subject. He defined a legal fiction as “either (1) a statement
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or
(2) a false statement recognized as having utility”63 and viewed them
not as creations intended to deceive, but rather as intellectual tools to
facilitate legal reasoning and guide courts to the best decision for the
case. Their utility made them acceptable—and less pernicious—to the
law. To Fuller, a “court by proceeding as if it were determining the
intent of the parties will normally reach a result that is in accord with
the ‘good sense of the case.’”64 Fictions guide as long as their author
and his audience realize that they are false statements. However, ac-
cording to Fuller, once a legal fiction is taken “seriously,” or “be-
lieved,” it “becomes dangerous and loses its utility”—although he did
not elaborate on this point.65
Scholars who have been critical of legal fictions have good rea-
son to be wary about judicial candor. Legal fictions are imbued with
the quality of falsehood and enable courts to tell a story about a case
that is clearly untrue. Whether this is inimical to legislative authority
or commendable as a form of judicial acumen depends on whether the
author of the legal fiction and his audience are consciously aware of
how that particular legal fiction affects broader social structures. As
legal fictions allow the courts to tell a story that is imagined, legal
fictions can be used to set norms for human behavior and social con-
duct. This is not a problem per se. The law is communicative in na-
ture, as it informs us of our rights and duties and offers guidance as to
61. Id. at 35.
62. Id. at 37.
63. FULLER, supra note 2, at 9 (1968).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 9–10.
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conduct our relationships. For this reason, Fuller calls the fiction a
“linguistic phenomenon” that works as a play of words yet deeply
influences thought.66
B. Fictions in Human Thought
Legal fictions are used to overcome limitations in human lan-
guage. Frequently the correct answer to a legal question cannot be
found within expressed legal language and, when this happens, a nor-
matively desirable outcome can only be reached through a legal fic-
tion. By telling a different story about the case before it, the court is
able to bridge a difficult legal question with what presiding judges see
as right, moral, and ethical. In these situations, a legal fiction is indis-
pensable in telling the different story and helping courts uphold legal
values. As an example, fairness in dealings is an important value in
every human transaction; the fiction of the constructive trust allows
courts to uphold this value by making parties to an agreement conform
to expectations to treat one another fairly. The fiction is pivotal in
reaching a just outcome when expressed legal language would other-
wise compel courts to a decision that thwarts the value of fairness.
The German philosopher Hans Vaihinger, to whom scholars writ-
ing on legal fictions often refer,67 helps us see that the nature of legal
inquiries is often ontological. Legal questions involve a search for the
right, moral, or ethical answer according to social conventions and
norms. On a more basic level, legal questions relate to the human con-
dition and how individuals manage relationships and scarce resources
in their environment. Legal inquiries aim to arrive at the most appro-
priate solution to interests between individuals and their broader soci-
ety. These varied interests are not always reconcilable. Legal inquiries
are therefore not just a dialogue around the vocabulary or words of the
law but a deeper investigation into principles and standards essential
to the well-being of individuals developing and forming relationships
in a society.
These principles and standards, however, do not avail themselves
of easy definition. A clear definition of morals, rightness, or ethics is
elusive. Vaihinger, by showing how human beings construct artificial
realities of the world—and fictionalize actual facts—shows how im-
portant fictions are in law. Use of legal fictions conveys the message
that unconscionable conduct will not be condoned. For instance,
66. Id. at 11.
67. See, e.g., Annemarieke Vermeer–Künzli, As If: The Legal Fiction in Diplomatic
Protection, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 37, 45–48 (2007); FULLER, supra note 2, at 94–106;
R.A. Samek, Fictions and the Law, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 290, 299–304 (1981).
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courts’ imposition of a fictional trust on parties who take unfair advan-
tage of others conveys the importance of fair conduct in social ar-
rangements. Vaihinger argues that fictions provide a systematic way
of thinking about society and its values. To Vaihinger, a complete
understanding of the world will always be out of reach as individuals
lack the perception needed to fully grasp objective reality. Objective
reality can only be inferred through these logical structures created by
the mind.68 As Vaihinger explains:
[T]he object of the world of ideas as a whole is not the portrayal of
reality—this would be an utterly impossible task—but rather to
provide us with an instrument for finding our way about more eas-
ily in this world. Subjective processes of thought inhere in the en-
tire structure of cosmic phenomena. They represent the highest and
ultimate results of organic development, and the world of ideas is
the fine flower of the whole cosmic process; but for that reason it is
not a copy of it in the ordinary sense. Logical processes are part of
the cosmic process and have as their more immediate object the
preservation and enrichment of the life of organisms . . . . The
world of ideas is an edifice well calculated to fulfill this purpose;
but to regard it for that reason as a copy is to indulge in a hasty and
unjustifiable comparison. Not even elementary sensations are cop-
ies of reality; they are rather mere gauges for measuring the
changes in reality.69
According to Vaihinger, these intellectual constructs allow us to
treat an impenetrable reality “as if” it matches our established—and
more understandable—thought models. Vaihinger uses examples from
various disciplines, from the physical sciences to philosophy, to show
how we develop these mental constructs to make sense of an objective
reality that is always beyond our grasp. For example, scientific classi-
fication of matter into elemental particles such as protons, electrons,
and electromagnetic waves allows scientists to better explain the phys-
ical world. The particles themselves, however, cannot be readily ob-
served or experienced through human perception. Quantum mechanics
can only assume the existence of these particles because their effects
on the physical world are observed.70 Vaihinger also considers the
atom a fiction.71 Vaihinger cites German philosopher Otto Liebmann,
68. VAIHINGER, supra note 10, at 3.
69. Id. at 15–16.
70. TONY HEYS & PATRICK WALTERS, THE NEW QUANTUM UNIVERSE 12–13
(2003) (describing an experiment where electrons can be observed passing through
slits on a thin metal plate even though the electrons themselves are not seen; they are
assumed to have “boil[ed] off” a heated wire).
71. To Vaihinger, the atom is fictional to science. It is a fiction, in that it is a mental
conception, which posits that matter is made up of infinitely small constituents not
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who argues that “the atom is a transitional idea whose provisional
character is obvious.”72 Like a constructive trust that bridges concrete
rules of law with the more fuzzy values of equity in specific cases, the
atom is an “interim concept” that allows “the chemist and the physicist
[to coordinate] their laws, which they cannot yet formulate in a purely
abstract manner” with the more practical practices of their fields.73
Just as legal fictions uphold important values in the law, fictions in
science create new and improved intellectual constructs to advance
our understanding of the natural world.74 To Vaihinger, most disci-
plines owe their progress to the use of “appropriate fictions and to the
ingenious methods based upon them.”75
Vaihinger identifies two largely unrelated disciplines—mathe-
matics and law—that are especially similar in their reliance on fic-
tions. In mathematics, fictions are essential because the field’s very
ontology is built on a reality that is difficult, if not impossible, to fully
grasp.76 Many mathematical concepts, such as the perfect circle, the
absolutely straight line, and infinity, are mental constructs mathemati-
cians and scientists adopted to help them understand the realities of
the physical and metaphysical world. These concepts establish a firm
foundation upon which these fields may operate. To Vaihinger, fic-
tions such as infinity and atoms help one understand the world and
one’s surroundings in a more complete sense as they reduce spatial
material to a comprehensible foundation and thereby provide proto-
types through which scientific enterprise may unfold.77 These
perceptible by ordinary human senses and therefore not within man’s experience. And
while the notion of the atom comprises various contradictions in itself, the atom is so
fundamental to scientific thought that without the atom, science fails altogether. See
VAIHINGER, supra note 10, at 70–72. Yet, as Vaihinger points out, “with it, true
knowledge and understanding is impossible.” The concept of the atomic structure “is
a group of contradictory concepts which are necessary in order to deal with reality.”
Id. at 71.
72. Id. at 71.
73. Id.
74. While Vaihinger acknowledges that concepts such as the atom have inherent
contradictions, he believes use of the concept over time will obscure these initial con-
tradictions as new constructs and fresh contradictions are called forth. Id. at 72.
75. Id.
76. The philosophical reality upon which mathematics is based is controversial
among mathematicians and philosophers and it suffices to note that there is a general
acceptance that there is a relationship between mathematics (however one defines it)
and science (however one defines it). See generally Stewart Shapiro, Mathematics
and Reality, 50 PHIL. SCI. 523, 525 (1983) (proposing that mathematics applies to
reality through the discovery of mathematical structures underlying the non-mathe-
matical universe).
77. Vaihinger, supra note 10, at 52–53 (“Empty space, and atoms interpreted in a
material sense, seem to be [ideational] constructs, but in actual fact they are only
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imagined principles are so useful because they help us understand
practical matters like space, energy, and the composition matter,
which we would have difficulty studying if the basic unit of matter
and the concept of boundlessness were not available to us as intellec-
tual tools.
Legal fictions operate the same way for the law. They produce
logical synergies between abstract legal realities, such as achieving
justice or arriving at the correct decision, and practical understanding
in the field. To Vaihinger, jurisprudence is a logical field where analo-
gies are often made between these fuzzy values and established rules
of law so that an ultimate legal decision can actually make sense. We
must be able to see the analogy between a person who takes unfair
advantage of another, like a poor widow in Binions v. Evans,78 and a
trustee who breaches his trust obligations to his beneficiaries to recog-
nize that the imposition of a constructive trust is the right decision in a
case. Thus, the fiction of the constructive trust “consist[ed] in sub-
suming a single case under a conceptual construct not properly in-
tended for it, so that the apperception is, in consequence, merely an
analogy.”79
As most laws are naturally limited in their coverage of those
eventualities that may arise, unforeseen factual scenarios and legal
problems must be subsumed within existing legal rules before a deci-
sion can be rendered. Law is a device to make sense of all of these
interactions; legal fictions are sometimes needed to fit all these inter-
actions into discrete, manageable boxes. Just as mathematicians must
assume that a curved line is actually a series of small straight lines to
study geometry, for instance, family lawyers treat adopted children as
the biological children of their adoptive parents to develop the laws of
inheritance and succession.80 Because law and mathematics work off
of inferences drawn from premises that are known or assumed to be
true, Vaihinger views these two fields as fertile for the utilization of
fictions. He states that “[a]part from mathematics, there is hardly any
domain more suitable than law for the deduction of logical laws and
their illustration, or the discovery of logical methods.”81
Fiction can serve a vital role in understanding law, mathematics,
and a range of other fields. Yet Vaihinger emphasizes that these fic-
fictions. If, however, we succeed in reducing everything to these fictions then the
world seems to be understood.”).
78. Binions, [1972] Ch. at 359.
79. Vaihinger, supra note 10, at 33.
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id. at 33.
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tions may backfire if taken too far. In other words, fictionalized analo-
gies used in these fields must not be confused with—and substituted
for—reality, because errors in analysis occur when the lines between
truth and imagination are not clearly drawn.82 The most useful legal
fictions are those that are clearly and unmistakably fictitious. A land-
lord pursuing an action for rent is treated as if he evicted his tenant if
he makes the property inhabitable; whether the landlord actually
evicted the tenant is irrelevant because the deprivation of the tenant’s
right to quiet enjoyment and habitation of the property destroys the
economic value of a leasehold.83 Likewise, for the purposes of inheri-
tance, an 80-year-old woman is treated in the same way as a 20-year-
old woman because children borne by either one of them could affect
the vesting of a gift, making it vest outside the period specified by the
law on perpetuities. The utility of these fictions lie in their fictitious-
ness. When a statement is so blatantly false, it makes it clear to the
practitioner or student of law that the law has to work in a particular
way for society to properly function.
The use of legal fictions is expected when law functions as an
expression of thought about the rules that govern social activity.84
Man’s ability to foresee and anticipate all contingencies that could
arise from social activity is bound by the limits of perception. Hence,
Fuller thought that some fictions, which he called “historical fictions,”
are used by the courts to subtly introduce changes in the law as these
contingencies arise. These fictions “introduce new law in the guise of
old.”85 The reliance on legal fictions to achieve these subtle changes
could be for various reasons—to bring about policy changes, achieve
stability in the law, avoid the inconvenience and expense of changing
82. Id. at 32 (“The logicians of the eighteenth century always regarded it as their
duty to include error in a general way within their logical systems. We must therefore,
as we have already stated, distinguish between real analogies, where discovery is the
work of induction and hypothesis, and purely fictional analogies due merely to sub-
jective method.”).
83. For an example of the fiction of constructive eviction, see Blackett v. Olanoff,
358 N.E.2d 817, 818 (Mass. 1977).
84. This idea originates from John Searle’s seminal contributions to the philosophy
of language, where he suggests that language introduces a commitment on the part of
its conveyor to convey the truth through his communication. This, in turn, grants the
conveyor the capacity to create new phenomena such as rights, duties, government,
private property, etc. Although Searle does not expressly state so, a corollary that
follows his thesis is that one social and institutional reality created by the use of
language would be a society’s legal system. See Searle, supra note 7, at 37–41.
85. FULLER, supra note 2, at 56.
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the law, and state a new principle in the simplest of terms.86 As soci-
ety develops, courts increasingly depend on legal fictions to extend the
law to unanticipated societal changes that were not captured by legal
rules at their time of enactment. Legal fictions bridge legal rules with
evolving social norms, and thus reinforce the normative functions of
law.87
The fictions of the fertile octogenarian and the precocious tod-
dler,88 for example, allow courts to invalidate gifts to descendants too
far removed from the testator and ease the testator’s control of asset
distribution long after he has died. These fictions support property ex-
change and social transactions by ensuring that valuable resources re-
main alienable and are not controlled by a remote testator who may no
longer be alive.89 Such fictions are beneficial to property law because
they facilitate social interactions and economic engagement by signal-
ing fundamental conventions about the law. Their blatant falsity
reveals a somewhat obscured reality about the property system: that
the alienability of property and free market exchange are essential to a
fully functioning society. The limitations of human language made
this subjective lie necessary to reveal the objective truth.
C. Troublesome Fictions
The benefits of legal fictions, however, must not obscure the po-
tential trouble these fictions may cause to some areas of the law. Fic-
tions are most likely to be troublesome in areas of the law that do not
avail themselves of logical inquiry. Troublesome fictions have the ca-
pacity to trap the law into a tight logic that, paradoxically, makes the
law illogical. While Fuller acknowledged that legal fictions can be
dangerous if they are taken seriously or believed to be true, he does
not elaborate on what he means by a legal fiction becoming “danger-
ous.”90 Here, I argue that fictions can become troublesome when they
86. Id. at 56–64. Fuller distinguishes these reasons by terming them “the conserva-
tion of policy, emotional conservatism, the conservatism of convenience, and . . . intel-
lectual conservatism.” Id. at 57.
87. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *43 (stating that legal fictions are “highly bene-
ficial and useful . . . [and] shall [not] extend to work an injury; its proper operation
being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result from the
general rule of law”).
88. See supra text accompanying note 32.
89. Simes, supra note 29, at 709. But cf. Haskins, supra note 30 at 44–46 (arguing
that the Rule Against Perpetuities was actually a compromise between the landed
class generally hostile toward capitalist ideas and judges in seventeenth century En-
gland struggling to define the perpetuity period where a testator could reach beyond
the grave and assert deadhand control over the distribution of property).
90. FULLER, supra note 2, at 10. See also supra text accompanying note 65.
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obscure, rather than reveal, truths about the world we live in. By rep-
resenting themselves as truth, fictions obscure reality and may even
sometimes be accepted as reality. As Fuller pointed out, legal fictions
can lose their usefulness and may even pose a danger to the legal
system when they are used without the full realization or acknowl-
edgement of their falsity because one can fail to see fictions for what
they are: mere tools used as aids in legal reasoning.91 Vaihinger was
also keen to emphasize that fictions, created to facilitate subjective
understanding of one’s external environment, are not real phenomena
or manifestations. They do not have a corresponding objective reality
or truth that can be grasped.92
As a clear example of this misuse of legal fiction, consider the
opinion of Lord Eldon in Ex parte Whitbread,93 a case famous for
introducing the doctrine of substituted judgment into property law. In
Ex parte Whitbread, the niece of a lunatic—a person who was once of
sound mind but was no longer94—petitioned the court to have a por-
tion of his estate distributed to her. Lord Eldon, who presided as the
Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, granted her petition on the as-
sumption that the lunatic would have made the allowance himself had
he been able to—without even considering the lack of a relationship
between the lunatic and his niece—because the lunatic would be hu-
miliated if his family were “sent into the world to disgrace him as
beggars.”95 By substituting his judgment for that of the lunatic, Lord
91. Id. at 9 (“In practice, it is precisely those false statements that are realized as
being false that have utility.”).
92. VAIHINGER, supra note 10, at 49 (commenting on the use of fictions in the field
of moral philosophy, Vaihinger states: “[T]he real principle of Kantian ethics [is] that
true morality must always rest upon a fictional basis. All the hypothetical bases, God,
immortality, reward, punishment, etc. destroy its ethical character, i.e.; we must act
with the same seriousness and the same scruples as if the duty were imposed by God,
as if we would be judged thereof, as if we would be punished for immorality. But as
soon as this as if is transformed into a because, its purely ethical character vanishes
and it becomes simply a matter of our lower interests, mere egoism.”). Vaihinger also
cautions against mistaking a familiarity with the fiction for the truth of the matter
when he, in describing “space” as a mathematical fiction, states: “[S]pace is a subjec-
tive construct because it is full of contradictions. It is a character of all true fictions
that they contain contradictions and the concept of space is simply riddled with them.
The conceptual construct of space has been invented and given form by the psyche
with a view to bringing order into the events which it encounters—the chaotic and
contradictory mass of sensations. Space is a construct with which we have become
gradually familiar, and which on account of its familiarity appears to be real and
entirely harmless.” Id. at 53.
93. Ex parte Whitbread, 2 Meriv. 99, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Ch. 1816).
94. Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Sub-
stituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1990).
95. Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
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Eldon redistributed private property without a clear donative or testa-
mentary intent on the property owner’s part. The doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment allows individuals to ask the court to make financial
decisions for “lunatic” relatives who are incapable of managing their
own financial affairs.96 The idea behind this doctrine is to place the
incapacitated individual’s court-assumed preferences at the center of
deliberation. Since that person is unable to express her preferences,
the relative stands as a surrogate. This is where the doctrine becomes a
fiction97—courts substitute their own judgment for that of a lunatic
and authorize gifts from the lunatic’s estate to his “immediate rela-
tions”98 when, in reality, the lunatic may neither have a relationship
with the relatives nor have given them part of his estate. The problem
with this fiction is that it allows the court to assume a subjective point
of view that is unsupported by the reality of the case rather than search
for observable evidence that reveal the lunatic’s actual preferences.
The doctrine of substituted judgment was used without a clear purpose
and it is conjecture what Lord Eldon intended to achieve with its
use.99
The doctrine of substituted judgment has not been limited to the
distribution of property to a lunatic’s relatives, as originally conceived
by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Whitbread. It has since been extended into
the law of informed consent and applied to any situation where the
“well-being of the ward” is affected. This includes cases in which the
ward was an “idiot”—in other words, someone who never had any
lucid intervals where his true preferences may have been gleaned.100
Unlike the lunatic, an idiot had “no past periods of competency to hark
back to” and “no future periods of competency to hope for.”101 The
potential for misuse of the doctrine of substituted judgment is greater
with the case of an idiot than with a lunatic. While it may be possible
to determine the judgment of a lunatic, it is impossible to do so for an
96. Harmon, supra note 94, at 16.
97. Id. at 22.
98. Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878.
99. See Harmon, supra note 94, at 23 (“While Lord Eldon purported to enter the
mind of the lunatic, he seemed to have made no effort to discover what had once been
in Mr. Hinde’s [the lunatic] mind. The Whitbread decision does not mention any
evidence of Mr. Hinde’s prior spending practices or his propensity for making gifts.
Nor was the relationship between Mr. Hinde and his niece examined. . . . Rather, we
get a rather bald assertion from Lord Eldon that granting the niece an allowance is
only what Mr. Hinde himself would do ‘if he were in a capacity to exercise any
discretion on the subject,’ and that granting the niece an allowance is only ‘wise and
prudent.’”).
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id.
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idiot who never had judgment to begin with. One cannot—and thus
should not—substitute judgment for a person who never had any pe-
riod of lucidity. As such a person was never capable of reasoned judg-
ment, there could be no desires or preferences that the court could
assume and for which it could substitute its judgment.
The deeply troubling aspect about importing the doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment into end-of-life medical care is that a doctrine that
appears to have been developed to manage the property of a lunatic
has now been used to deal with the life of a person who was not capa-
ble of reasoned judgment in the first place. Moreover, this doctrine is
being applied not only to situations involving the ward’s wealth but,
more fundamentally, his health and well-being. The doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment has been applied for completely unrelated and essen-
tially mismatched situations from the more benign situation that
confronted Lord Eldon in Ex parte Whitbread. Applying the doctrine
of substituted judgment to “the removal of vital tissues to the termina-
tion of life-support systems, from the sterilization of the mentally re-
tarded to the forced medication of the mentally ill”102 is much more
malignant and dangerous than applying it to the distribution of a luna-
tic’s wealth. According to legal scholar Louise Harmon, the importa-
tion of the doctrine of substituted judgment into the law of informed
consent allowed the state to “invade the bodily integrity of the incom-
petent without having to justify the invasion.”103 By relying on the
doctrine of substituted judgment, the courts are able to quietly make
normative decisions where the greater utility is chosen for “others
[who] are going to benefit from the use of the incompetent’s body, by
taking parts of the body, by relieving them of the presence of the
body, by ensuring the barrenness of that body, or by restraining the
body through chemistry.”104  The difficulty with extending the doc-
trine of substituted judgment to cases where an invalid person, who is
not—and never was—able to make decisions for his or her own well-
being is that it allows the integrity of a human being to be made sub-
servient to what the state assumes is in the patient’s best interest.
Paradoxically, the doctrine of substituted judgment seemed to be
intended as a judicial device to allow the court to act for the incompe-
tent and manage his estate, including distribution of property to his
relatives, as if the incompetent acted himself. The importation of this
doctrine into the law of informed consent is troubling for several rea-
sons. First, the justification for use of the fiction is unclear; we do not
102. Id. at 54.
103. Id. at 61.
104. Id. at 61–62.
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know whether the doctrine was introduced to promote fairness be-
tween the parties, increase efficiency of legal rules, or set a normative
standard. Second, the application of the doctrine to the distribution of
property is less grim than its application to medical and end-of-life
decisions. Though logical, the application of the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment for these medical-intervention decisions is severely out
of place. The trouble with such logical analyses is that broader socio-
logical and ethical questions can be ignored. Oliver Wendell Holmes
captured this point in The Common Law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics. In order to know what it is, we must know
what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must alternately
consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most
difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two into
new products at every stage. The substance of the law at any given
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then
understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the
degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very
much upon its past.105
When legal fictions are embraced as if they are true representa-
tions of reality, instead of mere mental constructs that lead one to the
truth, they cease to be useful. Fictions lose their utility as an aid in
legal analyses when one uses them without full consciousness of their
fictitiousness or recognition of their purpose as an intellectual link to a
more fundamental—but less understood—reality.106 The recognition
of a legal rule as fictitious keeps that rule in the service of the legal
system; its use helps more fundamental legal principles become dis-
cernible. However, when a legal fiction is taken literally or used with-
out conscious awareness of its false premises, the fiction transforms
into a legal rule that rigidly controls the legal system—as with the
introduction of Lord Eldon’s doctrine of substituted judgment into
105. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1887).
106. FULLER, supra note 2 at 9–10 (“A fiction taken seriously, i.e., ‘believed’ be-
comes dangerous and loses its utility. It ceases to be a fiction” in that a fiction must
either be “(1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its
falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.”).
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property law and eventually medical cases. Rather than serve the legal
system, such fictions cause trouble as more fundamental truths in the
field or evidence that should be searched for are blurred by these con-
ceits of the human mind. If not clearly seen to be fictitious, fictions
may be taken to be lawfully, philosophically, and morally instructive.
Legal fictions can be particularly troublesome because they work
as support structures to the law. For legal fictions that are not evi-
dently false or explicitly acknowledged by the law to be false state-
ments, it may become easy for the public to think that false legal
statements are indeed true. When fictions in the law transform into
binding legal principles—and as public acceptance of law as legiti-
mate authority causes individuals to be desensitized to the fallacies of
legal fictions—important evidence and logical arguments about fun-
damental legal, historical, and sociological truths about human ontol-
ogy may be ignored or dismissed as irrelevant.107
This self-deception defeats the very purposes for which fictions
are employed. Since the purpose of legal fictions is to further under-
standing in the field, help us conceptualize reality, and establish com-
mon-ground for conversation and intellectual exchange, development
in a field will be hindered when the use of fictions results in self-
deception. The need to grapple with the more difficult reality in a field
can be masked by a fiction that appears to be simple truth, causing
people to miss the challenge to pursue deeper inquiries and under-
standing about the field. Blindness to the truth or one’s choice to ig-
nore it can effectively prevent further inquiry into other evidence and
information that might lead to different and contradictory conclusions.
The fiction, which was actually a figment of the intellect, appears to
be a genuine and neat condition of the field. Ignoring the deeper truth
through use of the fiction may keep the conversation within familiar
grounds, but that also blurs pertinent—and often messier—questions
and issues which need to be openly considered.108
107. While the psychology and philosophy of self-deception is beyond the scope of
this article, Daniel Goleman offers a compelling account of how self-deception works,
the reasons the mind concocts self-deceits, and the effects of self-deception on the
human psyche. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF SELF-DECEPTION (1985). An interesting story of self-deception is the mind’s
ability to numb pain in situations of extreme anxiety. Goleman cites the “curious
detachment” David Livingston felt when a lion attacked him and shook him vigor-
ously and quotes Livingston as stating that when the lion shook him, “[i]t caused a
sense of dreaminess in which there was no sense of pain nor feeling of terror, though
[I was] quite conscious of all that was happening.” Id. at 29 (second alteration in
original).
108. Id. at 197–201 (describing how humans see what they want to see and hear
what they want to hear by constructing their own social reality within “frames” as a
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Thus, one may speculate that Professor Harmon’s real concern
with the importation of the doctrine of substituted judgment into the
law of informed consent in medical cases is less with the importation
of the legal fiction itself than with the law’s pretense that the mental
states and intentionality of a person who is permanently incompetent
and who never had any period of lucidity can be objectively accessed
and determined.109 Reliance on the fiction of substituted judgment and
the fallacy that the mind and intent of an incompetent patient can be
objectively accessed by the court allowed courts to ignore factual evi-
dence of the patient’s true wishes110 and other indicia that a particular
decision may not be in the patient’s best interest.111 The doctrine of
substituted judgment did not further understanding about the law of
informed consent. By allowing the court to substitute its judgment for
that of an incompetent person, the doctrine allows courts to skirt
around the hard questions that should be asked, such as the proper role
of law when families petition the court to make health decisions for a
person who is incompetent or the extent to which courts may violate
the bodily integrity of an incompetent at the request of family mem-
bers. The application of the doctrine of substituted judgment in the
law of informed consent should—but does not—say something about
the fundamental nature of the law and its role in difficult cases such as
health matters for an incompetent.
On Harmon’s account, the fiction of substituted judgment as used
in the law of informed consent does not accomplish any of the worthy
goals of legal fictions. Instead, the doctrine lets the law avoid more
challenging and pressing questions about the morality of utility-based
decisions by focusing on the fiction that judgment for the permanently
incompetent person can be reasonably substituted. Substituting the
commonly shared understanding of social activity, the individual’s role in that activ-
ity, and how that activity should play out according to an expected and assumed se-
quence of events called “scripts.” These frames with scripts tell us what to focus our
attention on and to ignore everything else outside that frame and script. The frame
therefore “directs attention away from all the simultaneous activities that are out of
that frame” and “defines a narrow focus where the relevant schemas direct attention,
and a broad, ignored area of irrelevance.”).
109. See generally Harmon, supra note 94 at 16.
110. Id. at 30–31 (citing Sheneman v. Manring, 107 P.2d 741 (Kan. 1940), where
evidence indicated that Mr. Dautschmann did not have a relationship with his daugh-
ter and could not have given her money even if she was destitute was not considered
by the courts).
111. Id. at 53–54 (citing In re Byrant, 542 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1988), where the trial
court ignored the possible harm to the patient’s health from the administration of
psychotropic drugs and substituted its judgment for the patient’s to give her the drug
because a “reasonable, competent person in the incompetent’s situation would have”
chosen to take the medication. In re Bryant, 542 A.2d at 1220.).
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court’s judgment for the incompetent’s can easily explain court deci-
sions to remove vital tissues, terminate life-support systems, sterilize,
and forcibly medicate the mentally retarded with psychotropic drugs at
the request of a guardian. Utility-based decisions are often made be-
cause someone benefits from “the use of the incompetent’s body,”
such as “by taking parts of the body, by relieving them of the presence
of that body, by ensuring the barrenness of that body, or by restraining
that body through chemistry” at the expense of the incompetent.112
The fallacy that judgment can be substituted by objective means ob-
scures a more important ethical and moral issue that should be dis-
cussed openly. As Harmon points out, “taking organs from
incompetents, terminating their life-support systems, sterilizing them,
and forcing psychotropic medication upon [incompetent individuals]
all raise deeply disturbing moral issues. And those deeply moral issues
should be examined by the light of day, not hidden in the dark.”113 An
examination of these moral issues may help us arrive at a more funda-
mental truth about some of the most important values of the law, or at
least challenge us to figure out what those values are.
The doctrine of substituted judgment is but one example of a
troublesome fiction. Generally speaking, fictions become troublesome
because we do not see them for their falsity and believe that they are
accurate statements of reality. Troublesome fictions may be taken as
statements about reality, and they must be treated with caution and
skepticism. Otherwise, they may obscure more important legal ques-
tions tucked beneath the austerity of the fiction. As fictions are able to
both clarify and obscure thinking about our reality, it may be useful
for jurists and academics to engage in more robust conversations
about the proper rationale for legal fictions and how they are used to
facilitate the application of legal rules so that clearer, more precise
thinking about the law may take place. As it appears, legal fictions are
not discussed as much today as they once were.114 But more recent
scholarship by academics, such as Peter J. Smith115 and Nancy J.
112. Harmon, supra note 94, at 61–62.
113. Id. at 62–63.
114. Id. at 1 (“The legal fiction used to be a hot topic on the jurisprudential agenda.
It was written and talked about passionately by those who wrote and talked about such
things in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then interest in the subject
withered and died, and virtually fell off the vine.”); see also Aviam Soifer, Reviewing
Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871, 874 (1986) (“Hardly anybody in the United
States talks much about legal fictions these days.”).
115. See generally Smith, supra note 52, at 1437 (exploring six reasons why judges
rely on new legal fictions—legal fictions that “a judge deploys . . . in crafting a legal
rule on a factual premise that is false or inaccurate”—and suggesting that although
judges may have great reasons to rely on new legal fictions, judges also do not gener-
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Knauer,116 has discussed the emergence of newer types of legal fic-
tions in the practice of law. These commentaries indicate that there is
much more to be said about legal fictions and the legal institution’s
dependency on these fictions to support the smooth operation of the
law. Continuous discussion and acute awareness of legal fictions and
their impact on law is important because fictions can become trouble-
some when they hide, rather than reveal, truths about the world we
live in.
Although legal fictions are in themselves benign and even essen-
tial to maintaining the law’s integrity, they can also be harmful to
legal analysis and critical thinking about legal principles. It will be-
come more difficult to think clearly about what a law ought to achieve
and make sense of it when legal institutions replace social and eco-
nomic realities with fictionalized suppositions about people, norms,
and beliefs. The essence or core morality of the law to preserve human
dignity and the common good will be lost should legal fictions be used
carelessly to a point where they conceal underlying truths about an
injustice or inequity and prevent remedial measures from being
taken.117 In hiding normative choices that courts make, legal fictions
may also produce the very unfairness that they were intended to pre-
vent.118 That “[s]omething hidden, something potentially dangerous or
brutal [that] can go beneath the surface of a legal fiction”119 is perhaps
the unfairness, the iniquity, and the immorality that would likely result
ally acknowledge the falsity of their premises. For this reason, new legal fictions may
deceive the public and hide the normative choices that judges make).
116. See Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 1 (2010) (describing the use of new legal fictions in the areas of empirical legal
studies, law and literature, and complex statutory schemes, and distinguishing these
new fictions from classical fictions which are transparently and demonstrably false;
Knauer argues that more recent scholarship on new legal fictions change—rather than
add on to—conversations about the law because this scholarship involves analyses of
fictions that are assumed to be, but cannot be proven to be, false).
117. The idea that the essence of the law is the preservation of human dignity and the
common good stems from the writings of classical natural lawyers. Aristotle, for ex-
ample, claimed that there is a “natural” way to govern people and protect the commu-
nity’s interest in what is just. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 92–93 (Roger Crisp
ed. & trans., 2011). See also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 44
(Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., 1988) (“law must concern itself . . . with the happiness
of the community.”). In a recent article, Leslie Meltzer Henry documented the fre-
quency in which the ideal of dignity is evoked in Supreme Court decisions, noting that
more judges are depending on the concept of dignity to reach hard constitutional deci-
sions. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169,
178–81 (2011).
118. Smith, supra note 52, at 1439 (“judges’ purported factual suppositions some-
times are devices, conscious or not, for concealing the fact that the judges are making
normative choices in fashioning legal rules.”).
119. Harmon, supra note 94, at 70.
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from the irresponsible use of legal fictions. We, as jurists and scholars,
must see the unfairness, the iniquity, and the immorality that can
sometimes be hidden beneath a legal fiction and deal with it appropri-
ately by recognizing the concealed reality.
The remainder of this paper examines a fiction in the copyright
system that is potentially troublesome: the doctrine of deemed author-
ship. Deemed authorship attributes the status of author to the employer
who engages creative talent to produce works for hire. The concept is
particularly troublesome as a legal fiction because it puts the employer
in the same category as the creator of the work without making finer
distinctions about their contribution to the final product. The fiction of
the employer-author obscures important constitutional questions left
unanswered about who an author is and what the law expects of a
person designated as an “author.”
To analyze the potentially troublesome effects of the fictionalized
employer-author and discuss the analytical difficulties in the concept
of deemed authorship, the remaining portions of this paper examine
the concept of deemed authorship and its rationale, history, and insti-
tutionalization in copyright law. This part of the article juxtaposes the
rationale, history, and institutionalization of the fiction against more
fundamental questions about originality, authorship, and the role of
markets in promoting the progress of science that permeates through-
out copyright law and theory. What follows will be a discussion of
how to engage with the legal fiction and recognize its falsity in order
to initiate a conversation about the more difficult questions in copy-
right law. As a final observation on the doctrine of deemed authorship,
this paper contemplates the benefits for the legal system when a legal
fiction does not deceive, but rather illuminates the law and makes the
law a more effective language that communicates conventional behav-
ioral expectations between a legal institution and its subjects.
II.
ANALYTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE CONCEPT
OF DEEMED AUTHORSHIP
It may be fitting to start the discussion on deemed authorship by
noting that central to the copyright system is the rule on originality,
which requires a literary or artistic work to originate from and be orig-
inal to an “author.”120 Before copyright law will consider a literary
120. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (hold-
ing that names, town, and telephone numbers of utility subscribers are not copyright-
able, since they do not originate from an author).
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and artistic work sufficiently creative to be eligible for copyright pro-
tection, the work must be conceived by an author, who for all intents
and purposes is the actual creator of the work.121 An author must write
his book, a composer must compose his music, and an artist must
paint his picture for copyright law to apply. This rule precludes works
that are mere copies of another work from copyright protection, as
copies are unoriginal and therefore cannot be attributed to an “au-
thor.”122 A pirate is not an author because he copied the work and did
not create it; the work did not originate from him. The author there-
fore, being the person from whom the work originated, is pivotal to
copyright. An unauthorized use of a work will never be an infringe-
ment of copyright if the individual asserting infringement is unable to
prove that the work was a product of original thought, conception, and
intellectual production. The work must owe its origins to an author.123
The concept of deemed authorship is the notable exception to this
rule. It modifies the rule that a work must be original to the author to
be classified as a “work of authorship” by allowing someone other
than the true creator of the work to be deemed the author and first
owner of the copyright.124 This practice was initially contemplated by
the courts during the 1860s. In this period, the courts tried to manage
assignments of copyright between an employer and its employee and
default rules for the initial allocation of ownership rights in creative
121. Id. at 345–46 (“The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. . . . Original, as the term is
used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the au-
thor . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” The Court
goes on to say that “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement” and that it is “unmis-
takably clear” that the terms “authors” and “writings” “presuppose a degree of
originality.”).
122. The rule was codified in Section 102 of the Copyright Act 1976, which states
that “[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” Act of Oct. 19, 1976, ch. 1,
90 Stat. 2541, 2544 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)) (emphasis
added).
123. Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884) (limiting copyright to the
kind of work that “embod[ies] the intellectual conceptions of its author, in which there
is novelty, invention, originality, and therefore comes within the purpose of the con-
stitution in securing its exclusive use or sale to its author,” and requiring that, to prove
infringement, “the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of
thought, and conception” must be shown). See L. Baitlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (sustaining a preliminary injunction restraining the enforce-
ment of copyright because the work was essentially a copy of a design patent in the
public domain and therefore lacked originality).
124. Usually, the actual author is considered the first owner of copyright. Section
201(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 states: “Copyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.” Act of Oct. 19, 1976, ch. 2,
90 Stat. 2541, 2568 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012)).
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works had to be established.125 Before the mid-nineteenth century,
courts treated each creative work as belonging to the person who cre-
ated it. The default rule at that time was that a creator was the author,
who had to expressly sign away his rights before a court would con-
clude that another person owned the copyright in the work. Hence in
Heine v. Appleton,126 for instance, the court held that the drawings of
an artist, who accompanied Commander Perry to Japan and the China
Sea on an expedition funded by the U.S. government in 1852–54, be-
longed to the United States because Heine expressly agreed to hand
over property in the drawings to them.127
Courts began to modify this doctrine as they faced more cases
where numerous people participated in the creative process. This
called for someone—often the creators’ employer—to represent the
collective as owner of the copyright.128 An additional reason for this
change in the default position was because more employers were par-
ticipating in the employee’s creative process. One example is the 1885
case of Schumacher v. Schwencke, where the Court of Appeals in New
York decided that a corporation owned the copyright in an employee’s
work because the corporation’s president, himself a respectable artist,
was personally involved with and had supervised the design and pro-
duction of the employee’s creative work.129  Eighteen years later, in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., employees of the plaintiff,
a chromolithography company, prepared three chromolithographs for
a circus advertisement, which were then copied by the defendant. The
Supreme Court awarded ownership of the designs to the plaintiff com-
pany, stating that the drawings were “produced by persons employed
and paid by the plaintiffs in their establishment to make those very
things,”130 thus taking a more affirmative stance that employers
owned their employees’ work by virtue of their position as the em-
ployer. But even as these cases held that the employer was the owner
125. Catherine Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-For-Hire Doctrine,
15 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 1, 33–43 (2003) (describing the law’s transition from favor-
ing the author to favoring the employer by basing their decisions on other factors
besides originality in a copyrightable work, such as making adaptations to the work
and owning workplace knowledge). The default rule at that time was, however, pro-
employee. A principle that favored employer ownership of copyright slipped in over
time in the dicta of several cases. Id. at 44.
126. Heine v. Appleton, 11 F. Cas. 1031, 1032–33 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857) (No. 6324).
127. Fisk, supra note 125, at 30.
128. Id. at 32.
129. Schumacher v. Schwencke, 25 F. 466, 466 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885). See also Mut.
Adver. Co. v. Refo, 76 F. 961, 963 (1896).
130. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
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of property in the copyrighted work, they fell short of holding that the
employer was also the author of the work.
This changed when the concept of deemed authorship was codi-
fied into Section 62 of the 1909 Copyright Act131 and later into Sec-
tion 201(b) of the current Copyright Act of 1976132 as the work-for-
hire doctrine.133 Section 62 of the 1909 Act considered an employer
the author of the work if its employee created a work for hire.134 Like-
wise, Section 201(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 states that “[i]n the
case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom
131. Section 62 states: “[T]he word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of
works made for hire.” Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 62, 35 Stat., 1075,
1088 [hereinafter “Copyright Act of 1909.”].
132. Section 201(b) states: “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instru-
ment signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.” Act of Oct.
19, 1976, ch. 2, 90 Stat. 2541, 2568 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(2012)).
133. The work-for-hire doctrine in copyright law is the embodiment of the fiction of
the employer author. The doctrine treats an employer, who employs a creator who
produces literary and artistic works, as the author of the work and not merely the
owner of copyright. The idea of attributing authorship status to someone other than
the author was not employed by the courts as rhetoric to remedy an injustice or adjust
laws to evolving social conditions. Instead, the concept of deemed authorship was
used to assure the transferability of authorial status (and with it the initial allocation of
copyright) and grant property rights in creative works to the party who employed the
creator. In allocating authorial rights over the work to an employer, copyright law
chose to protect the work’s economic value but by doing so, compromised on protect-
ing the creator’s human dignity, and minimized any personal connection that the crea-
tor may have the work.
In the two cases before the work-for-hire doctrine was codified into the Copy-
right Act of 1909, the courts held that the employer and the commissioner of a work
owned the copyright to it. See Collier Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence
Schools, 94 F. 152 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899); and Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1900). In Dielman the court stated:
In general, when an artist is commissioned to execute a work of art not in
existence at the time the commission is given, the burden of proving that
he retains a copyright in the work of art executed, sold, and delivered
under the commission rests heavily upon the artist himself. If a patron
gives a commission to an artist, there appears to be a very strong implica-
tion that the work of art commissioned is to belong unreservedly and
without limitation to the patron.
Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
The work-for-hire doctrine is reminiscent of the patronage system of the pre-
literary marketplace of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries where authors
provided literary services for wages and certain state privileges. At that time, “the
concept of an author owning a work did not quite fit the circumstances of literary
production in the traditional patronage system.” MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 16–17 (1993).
134. Copyright Act of 1909, supra note 131.
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the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title.”135 With statutory codification now, the employer is not just
owner of the copyright; he is also the author of the work. The fiction
that authorship can be alienated from the true creator and deemed on
anyone else came to be entrenched into the law with the passing of
these statutory provisions.
Deeming authorship on someone other than the true creator of the
work has its utility. This notion allows the law to treat a single person
or entity as the author and first owner of copyright in situations where
many individuals collaborate to produce creative works. In such cases,
one person or entity, whose name is used to disclose the work to the
public, is represented to the world as the author of the collective
work.136 Peer production over Internet content also involves many in-
dividuals who collaborate in a decentralized way by relying on so-
cial—rather than economic—incentives to produce new forms of
information, knowledge, and cultural materials on a massive scale.137
Deemed authorship is a useful tool to mobilize millions of individuals
to collaborate with a designated “author” on a creative project which
they believe in and support—even when not remunerated finan-
cially.138 The “author” in this case has strong mobilizing power if it is
an organization that possesses a strong online presence, a well-
respected reputation, and the ability to draw crowds.
Deemed authorship is also useful in designating a single party as
the initial owner of copyright for works that are an accumulation of
different creative components. Cinematographic works are a prime ex-
ample. As cinematographic works require creative input from multiple
sources, a cinematographic work would most likely be a joint collabo-
ration with multiple copyright owners but for the work-for-hire doc-
trine.139 Deeming authorship on a single entity significantly reduces
135. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, ch. 2, 90 Stat. 2541, 2568 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012)).
136. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGH-
BORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 367 (2006).
137. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 81 (2006).
138. Many of these non-commercial projects involve pursuits that are scientific and
involve inquiries for the common good of society. Individuals participate to contribute
to a worthy goal. For example, the SETI@home project involves the search for extra-
terrestrial intelligence; Folding@home is a protein folding stimulation aimed at curing
Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s, Parkinson’s, and many other diseases; FightAIDS@Home
runs drug design software to evaluate the right candidate for drug discovery; and
Genome@home models artificial genes that can be used to generate useful proteins.
See id. at 82–83.
139. Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a work for hire as: “(1) a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\17-3\NYL303.txt unknown Seq: 34 15-OCT-14 7:56
740 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:707
transaction costs of seeking multiple licenses from various contribu-
tors to a cinematographic work.140 Deeming authorship on the em-
ployer or commissioner of a work may also allow the work to be
distributed to the public more cheaply.141
The fiction of the deemed author may be efficient for all these
reasons. It may also be equitable in some situations to grant initial
ownership of copyright to the author’s employer or the work’s com-
missioner. Through the work-for-hire doctrine, initial ownership of
copyright may be allocated to a single entity who may present the
work to the public as its author and owner. The fiction creates a
bright-line rule that is easy to apply. It simplifies the licensing of col-
laborative works; it encourages employers, commissioners, and con-
noisseurs of art to invest in creative talent; and it allows creative
works to be more efficiently distributed to the public. There is no
doubt that the fiction is useful—as most legal fictions are.
While the concept of deemed authorship may be useful in consol-
idating a multitude of ownership rights stemming from multiple acts
of authorship, designating the employer of creative employees as the
author of the work appears specious. Some scholars have asked for
studies to be conducted to evaluate the implications of the work-for-
hire doctrine142 and while no actual data are available, it has been
hypothesized that such studies may reveal that deeming authorship on
someone other than the actual creator compromises the authenticity
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary
work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test,
or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” Act of Oct. 19, 1976, ch. 1, 90
Stat. 2541, 2544 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
140. John L. Schwab, Audiovisual Works and the Work-For-Hire Doctrine in the
Internet Age, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 141, 146 (2011).
141. I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law’s Work-Made-For-
Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 181, 181 (1988) (arguing that the work-
for-hire doctrine allocates copyright with the person most able to exploit the work and
bring it to the attention of the public because they have “greater resources, experience,
or better market position.”).
142. Richard Colby, Works Made for Hire in International Copyright Law, 3 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 87, 87 (1983) (noting that Professor Mario Fabiani of Rome Uni-
versity has suggested that scholars initiate studies on the problems related to the pro-
tection of “salaried authors”). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative
Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 638 (1987) (sug-
gesting that studies should be done for institutions that try to assert authorship over
academic writings).
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and quality of work produced.143 Since the fiction of the employer-
author is a concept that contradicts what is socially and perhaps intui-
tively known of a human creator and author of a creative work,144 a
study of its implications on creative output may help us understand
how pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards affect the production of
creative works in terms of their value to progress. Contextualizing the
fiction of the employer-author would allow for conversations about
other under-conceptualized but important areas of copyright law, such
as the role of the author in promoting progress together with the no-
tions of authorship, originality, and authenticity and what they actually
mean or should mean in the law, to begin earnestly.
Analytical difficulties with the concept of deemed authorship
may stem from the fact that copyright law has a very nebulous idea of
the author. This may be less of a concern if our understanding of who
the author is and what authorship actually means in the law were
sound. But we don’t have a clear understanding of the author or au-
thorship. As the author is considered by law to be the person from
whom a work originates and is important in determining consequential
issues in copyright law such as the durational span of the copyright
term,145 claims to moral rights,146 and termination or renewal of copy-
143. Dreyfuss, supra note 142, at 591 (arguing that the progress of science is depen-
dent not only on the quantity of creative works produced but also on the quality of
these works).
144. Normally, the author is someone who is somehow connected personally to the
work because he or she created it. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (defining the
author as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who com-
pletes a work of science or literature.”). In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co.,
the court decided that chromolithographs used to advertise a traveling circus may be
copyrightable because, though they were intended to reproduce actual things, they
were also the “personal reaction of an individual upon nature.” Justice Holmes, who
wrote the decision went on to state: “Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.” Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
145. Generally, the copyright duration for works is measured against the life of the
author. Under Section 302(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, a copyright shall endure for
a term “consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.” 17
U.S.C. § 302(a)–(b) (2013).
146. Moral rights are the non-assignable, non-waivable personal and creative rights
of the author that protect the author’s integrity and personality. They are conceptually
different from the author’s economic rights, which are transferrable and waivable
under the law. Under Section 106A(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act the author of a work
of visual arts is entitled to claim authorship or deny authorship to a work that has been
distorted, mutilated, or modified in a manner that would be prejudicial to the author’s
honor or reputation. The author also has the right to prevent the distortion, mutilation,
or modification of a work that would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation and also
prevent the destruction of a work of recognized stature. Section 106A(b) of the Copy-
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right,147 it is ironic that the author is not explicitly defined in the law.
Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act defines a work of authorship
with more precision to include works of a literary, musical, dramatic,
choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, or audiovisual nature.148
From that, one may presume that these works must be created by a
natural person.149 But for some inexplicable reason, neither U.S. statu-
tory law nor case law has confined the definition of the “author” of a
literary and artistic work to natural persons. The author does not have
to be the individual who successfully translates an idea or mental im-
agery into literary, musical, or artistic expressions.150 It has also not
right Act 1976 states that only the author of the work has these rights. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)–(b) (2013).
147. Under Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909, the copyright term was divided
into two separate terms of 28 years each. The renewal right to the second copyright
term belonged to the author of the work and his spouse and/or children if the author is
no longer alive at the time of copyright renewal. This durational division of copyright
term was brought under the Copyright Act of 1976 for works that were still protected
by copyright as of Jan. 1, 1978 and provided authors with an additional right to termi-
nate license grants for the second copyright term. Under Section 304(c) of the Copy-
right Act of 1976, the author of the work created before Jan. 1, 1978 is entitled to
terminate licenses granted over the renewal copyright or any right under it. Section
304(c) expressly excludes works for hire. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2013).
The Copyright Act of 1909 with two copyright terms applies to works published
in compliance with copyright formalities before Jan. 1, 1978, and the 1976 Act with a
single copyright term applies to works fixed in a tangible medium of expression after
Jan. 1, 1978.
148. “Works of authorship” is defined as including literary works, musical works,
dramatic works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound recordings and archi-
tectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2013).
149. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest just that when it
stated that the word “author” in the copyright statute “is taken from the traditional
activity of one person sitting at a desk with a pen and writing something for publica-
tion.” The court goes on to state that “[t]he word is traditionally used to mean the
originator or the person who causes something to come into being, or even the first
cause, as when Chaucer refers to the ‘Author of Nature.’” Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202
F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2000).
150. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not define who an author is under its defini-
tions section, Section 101. Neither does the Copyright Act of 1909 in its definitions
section. Other than the statements that the author is the creator of an expressive work,
very little else has been said of the author in case law. See generally Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53. It is also worthy to note that while the court
in Aalmuhammed indicated that an author should be a human person who creates a
work, the issue the case centered on the ownership rights of a subject matter expert,
who made creative contributions to a movie and attempted to claim joint ownership
for his contributions to the script as a co-author. Since Warner Brothers as the pro-
ducer of the movie made everyone who worked on the movie sign work-for-hire
agreements, it—a movie studio—was considered the actual author of the work. Aal-
muhammed, 202 F.3d at 1230. For a discussion of the issues in this case and the
special problems with authorship in the movie industry, see F. Jay Dougherty, Not a
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helped that the main international convention on copyright law, the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
aiming to protect the “rights of authors in their literary and artistic
works,”151 has also been silent on the definition of “author.” This has
inevitably caused uncertainty about authorship among different juris-
dictions.152 However, it should be noted that some countries have cop-
yright laws that reserve authorial status only to natural persons, and
not juridical persons or corporations.153
Recognizing that individual authors may have personal connec-
tions with the work may encourage artistic and authorial commitment
to producing authentic expressions for the progress of science.154
Given that the law’s goal to promote progress of science is attained
through the writings of authors,155 the law encourages authors to cre-
ate through exclusive rights granted over creative expressions.156 The
grant of these rights presupposes that economic incentives are the pri-
mary motivation for creativity, as the theory goes, the assignment and
Spike Lee Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motions Pictures Under U.S. Copyright
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225 (2001).
151. The Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works states:
“The countries to which this Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection
of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.” Berne Convention on the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. I, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No.
99–27 [hereinafter “Berne Convention”].
152. See PASCAL KAMINA, FILM COPYRIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 131 (2002)
(“There is no definition of the term ‘author’ in the Convention, and its usual meaning
it still the subject of controversy.”). Although, from the inception of the Berne Con-
vention, the term “author” has been understood to mean a natural person and not a
legal or juristic person. See RICKETSON, supra note 136, at 358 n.3.
153. For instance, the French copyright system reserves authorship for natural per-
sons. See Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 561 n.75 (2006).  Under art. 7 of the German Copyright Law
of 1965, the author is the creator of the work, however, the law excludes juridicial
persons from the definition of the “creator of the work.” Only natural persons can be
considered the author of the work. See also GRAHAM DUTFIELD & UMA SUTHER-
SANEN, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 86 (2008) (discussing both French
and German laws).
154. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that the main goal of the
copyright system is to “advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors”).
155. The Constitution of the United States empowers Congress to “promote the Pro-
gress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. “The Progress of Science” in the
Constitution is generally taken to mean “the creation and spread of knowledge and
learning” or the “proliferation of knowledge.” See Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873,
888 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
156. These rights are the rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works
based on the work, distribute the work, perform the work publicly, display the work
publicly, and in the case of sound recordings, perform the work by means of a digital
audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2013).
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transfer of these rights allow authors to capture the economic value of
their work, which in turn encourages creativity.157 It is also important
to consider whether works that are less authentic but more “marketa-
ble” have as great an impact on the progress of science as more au-
thentic works.158
The Constitution itself contemplates the alienation of ownership
of specific rights granted under the law.159 But this does not mean that
it permits the alienation of authorship through the fiction that another
person—other than the true creator—could be deemed author. Judge
Friendly seemed to recognize the problem with the fiction of deemed
authorship when he noted in a dissenting opinion160 that the Constitu-
tion “authorizes only the enactment of legislation securing ‘authors’
the exclusive right of their writings” and that it “would thus be quite
doubtful that Congress could grant employers the exclusive right to
the writing of employees regardless of the circumstances.”161 Some
copyright scholars have expressed similar concerns about the constitu-
157. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The im-
mediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. ‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly,’ this Court has said, ‘lie in the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors.’”) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S.
123, 127 (1932)).
158. Universities, for example, allow for more authentic expressions because of the
academic freedom guaranteed to its teachers. Creative works from universities have a
different impact on progress than creative works from economic-driven organizations.
See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Moral Rights for University Employees and Stu-
dents: Can Educational Institutions Do Better Than The U.S. Copyright Law?, 27 J.C.
& U.L. 53, 79 (2000).
159. The U.S. Constitution allows Congress to grant copyrights, property rights over
creative works, that can be transferred and exchanged for market rewards to en-
courage authors to be creative. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted
to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.”).
160. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
161. Id. The drafters of the Copyright Act of 1909 appeared to have thought that the
Constitution intended to limit the word “author” to the original author of the word and
“possibly . . . frustrating the attempt to vest ownership in employers.” Bracha, supra
note 15, at 263. It is speculated that the drafters provided a statutory definition of the
author to include an employer to circumvent the Constitutional limitation. By so do-
ing, “[a]uthorship, as a constitutional requirement, was simultaneously accorded due
respect and defined out of existence.” Id.
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tionality of the work-for-hire doctrine.162 Similarly, the authors of a
leading copyright textbook highlighted constitutional concerns with
deeming authorship on the employer:
[A]n employer qua employer cannot by definition be regarded as
an “author” and therefore in the absence of an assignment from his
author-employee may not constitutionally be entitled to claim cop-
yright. . . . A constitutional defense of Sec. 201(b) of the current
Act, and of Sec. 26 of the 1909 Act merely on the basis that Con-
gress has created a sort of legal fiction in regarding an employer as
the author renders meaningless the Copyright Clause’s use of the
term. If Congress may “deem” an employer to be the author, is
there any limit to the other classes of persons (besides the true au-
thor) who may be the recipient of Congressional beneficence in this
manner?163
Aside from arguments about its constitutionality, deeming au-
thorship on someone other than the true creator of the work may also
run counter to logic and experience and significantly affect social and/
or cultural norms. Creativity and authorship are intellectual activities
that are innately human and cannot be divested, as cognitive processes
and expressions are as unique to an individual as his or her thumb
print.164 Furthermore, many authors identify their work as their per-
sonal creation and expression, which communicates to the rest of the
world who they are, what they think, and how they feel.165  Yet when
corporate employers and commissioners of creative individuals are
162. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1090 (2003) (“Whatever the practical merits of the work
for hire doctrine, the constitutional text supplies no grounding for it.”); Mark H. Jaffe,
Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again—Determining Authorship in a Sound Record-
ing, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S.A. 139, 197 (2006) (“The Constitution provided
Congress with the power to grant rights to those who create original works of expres-
sion. If those rights are denied to those who ought to be entitled, the validity of Con-
gress to enact and enforce laws under the Copyright Act is undermined.”); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Authors in Disguise: Why the Visual Artist Rights Act Got It Wrong,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 741, 749–50 (“By simply positing that the employer becomes the
author, the work-for-hire doctrine gives no consideration to the consequences of
deeming the employer to be the physical source of the creation.”).
163. MELVILLE B. NIMMER ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND
OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION,
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 373 (2005) (citing Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239
(1911), which states that the “power to create presumptions is not a means of escape
from constitutional restrictions.”).
164. Tom Cochrane, Expression and Extended Cognition, 66 J. AESTHET. ART CRIT.
329 (2008) (arguing that there is an “extremely intimate connection between the emo-
tional content of the music and the emotional state of the person who produces that
music.”).
165. John T. Cross, An Attribution Right for Patented Inventions, 37 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 139, 146 (2012) (“Creating a work of art or literature can be an intensely per-
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recognized as the actual author of the work and initial owner of copy-
right, the law deprives the real creator of his identity as the author of
the work. If the identity of an individual as the author qua author can
be isolated and deemed on another, there is inherent legal significance
in who created the work. By deeming an employer or a commissioner
of a creative work as the work’s author, the actual author easily be-
comes disenfranchised from the role he or she has in promoting pro-
gress through creative expression.166
While there are certain advantages to the doctrine of deemed au-
thorship, Fuller’s167 and Vaihinger’s168 caution that fictions be only
used with full awareness of their falsity must be borne in mind. A
fiction is neither truth nor reality: it is a mere conceptual construct
invented to give substantive form to legal analyses. This cautionary
approach to fictions must be kept in mind to avoid analytical difficul-
ties, which arise when the use of a fiction is not accompanied by the
explicit acknowledgement of its falsity. There must be a clear recogni-
tion that the real purpose in copyright law for deeming authorship on
someone other than the creator is to consolidate ownership of copy-
right into a single entity.169 The fiction becomes troublesome when
society forgets this reason and sees the fiction as truly divesting the
real author of his or her rights. This will have the effect of obscuring
sonal process. In many cases, the author creates because of a desire to express her
own observations about the world around her.”).
166. An example of the true creator of the work being disenfranchised is when he is
deprived of moral rights protection. In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77,
87–88 (2d Cir. 1995), the court denied injunctive relief to three professional sculptors
who sought to prevent the modification or destruction of their walk-through sculpture
located in the building lobby of the defendants, who owned the building that con-
tained the sculpture. The court held that since the artists were employed by the previ-
ous building owner to design, create, and install the sculptures in the building, the
sculpture was a work-for-hire. As the moral right to prevent the destruction of a crea-
tive work is only provided to works of visual art under the Visual Arts Rights Act of
1990, and as Section 101 excludes a work for hire from the definition of a “work of
visual art,” the court denied the sculptors relief. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1)(B) (2012).
See also infra note 170 for a discussion of employer-employee relationship and the
work-for-hire doctrine in this case.
167. See generally FULLER, supra note 2.
168. See generally VAIHINGER, supra note 10.
169. For a detailed description of this rationale for the work-for-hire doctrine, see
United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Work Made for Hire, supra
note 15 at 141 (“The economic rationale for the 1976 Copyright Act’s work for hire
provisions is rooted in the well-documented problem of transaction costs. . . . By
allowing the parties to definitively confer for-hire status on these works, [the Act]
promotes marketability by making it possible for parties to eliminate an otherwise
chaotic state of copyright title, centering full ownership in a single individual or entity
and thus facilitating the secure and fluent transfer of ownership interests over the life
of the copyright.”).
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the person of the author, alienating authorship, and devaluing the re-
quirement of originality as the cornerstone of the copyright system.
Each of these consequences is discussed in turn.
A. The Mystification of the Author
Deemed authorship and the work-for-hire doctrine obscure and
mystify an already nebulous idea of the author. Since authorship has
never been explicitly defined in international or national copyright
laws, it is vital that deemed authorship be used carefully to avoid the
mistaken belief that individual human producers of creative works can
easily have their rights divested by the law or that the creative contri-
butions of these individual creators are not significant to the progress
of science. When the law designates an employer or commissioner as
the author, especially when the law does not require the employer or
commissioner to make any form of creative contribution to the
work,170 the question of who is the actual creator of a work is bound
to lose significance.171
170. The Supreme Court has held that the hiring party need only have a “right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished,” as is defined in
the general common law of agency, for a hired party to be considered an employee.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). If an em-
ployer has the right to control how the work is produced and its employee produces a
work during the course of his or her employment, the work will be considered a work-
for-hire and the employer will be considered the author of that work. Some factors
that the Court thought were relevant to the inquiry of whether an employment rela-
tionship existed between the hiring and hired parties include: the level of skill re-
quired of the hired party to produce the work; the source of the hired party’s
instrumentalities and tools; where the work was located; the length of the relationship
between the hiring and hired parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign
additional projects to the hired party; how much discretion the hired party had over
when and how long to work; how the hired party was paid; whether the hired party
had a role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is running a business; whether
the hiring party provides employee benefits to the hired party; and the tax treatment of
the hired party. Id. at 751–52. The Reid test was applied by the Second Circuit in
Carter, supra note 166, in which the court decided that the sculptors were employees
even though they had “full authority in design, color and style,” and the employer
only retained the “authority to direct the location and installation of the artwork within
the building.” Carter, 71 F.3d at 80. The court seemed swayed by the other factors in
the Reid test: the employers had also assigned additional projects to the sculptors and
had “paid payroll and social security taxes, provided employee benefits such as life,
health, and liability insurance and paid vacations, and contributed to unemployment
insurance and workers’ compensation funds on plaintiffs’ behalf.” Id. at 86–87.
171. See, e.g., Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music v. UMG Recordings, Inc., No. 08 CIV.
6143(DLC), 2010 WL 3564258 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2010). This case involved the
ownership of the renewal term of copyrights in certain sound recordings created by
singer-song writer Bob Marley before Jan. 1, 1978. UMG’s successors-in-interest en-
tered into a series of exclusive recording agreements with Marley, where Marley
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It certainly does not help that academic literature has neither bol-
stered nor augmented this scant image of the author in copyright law.
Some prominent scholars have promoted the idea that the author is
barely more than a socially constructed metaphor developed to con-
vince the public that creative works are a valuable market commodity.
For example, in The Author, Art, and The Market, Professor Martha
Woodmansee asserts that the author as original creator only emerged
when professional writers, seeking to earn their livelihood by writing
for a burgeoning literary market in the Eighteenth Century, tried to
redefine their roles in the production of literary works.172 According
to Woodmansee, the repackaging of the writer as an author conjured
up the image of an original and inspired genius; because an author’s
inspiration emanated from within, his work was distinctly his product
and thus his property.173 He was no longer a mere craftsman or writer.
The ideas of the “author” and the “original genius” allowed writers to
justify earning their living through the commodification and commer-
cialization of literary works. These ideas also convinced the reading
public of the intrinsic value of the author’s work.174 Thus, in this
spirit, when Lyrical Ballads was first received unfavorably by the
public, Wordsworth quipped that any work of original genius includ-
ing his own had the task of enlightening its readers by “widening the
sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honor, and benefit of
human nature.”175
Scholars who have studied copyright history in England and the
United States have made analogous claims. In Copyright in Historical
Perspective, Lyman Ray Patterson documented the history behind the
Statute of Anne—the world’s first law expressly recognizing authors
as owners of their works, giving authors separate and independent
would be paid certain advances against his royalties for the creation of the sound
recordings. The recording company registered itself as the author of sound recordings
when it registered the recordings with the Copyright Office. After Marley’s death and
when the copyright in the recordings came up for renewal, his widow Rita sought a
declaratory judgment that they were the owners of the renewal term for copyright in
the sound recordings pursuant to Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Cote, J.,
held that the sound recordings were works-for-hire, which made UMG the “statutory
author,” even if in the “common dictionary sense” Marley was the “creator or source
of the Sound Recordings.” Id. at *7. She goes on to say, “[t]he fact that Marley may
have exercised artistic control over the recording process . . . is legally irrelevant;
what is dispositive is that [the recording company] had the contractual right to accept,
reject, modify, and otherwise control the creation of the Sound Recording.” Id. at *10.
172. MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING
THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 36 (1996).
173. Id. at 37.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 39.
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copyrights of their own.176 The law gave authors the exclusive right
and liberty to print their works for 21 years, whereas previously only
members of the Stationer’s Company—which was comprised of sta-
tioners, booksellers, and printers of books—had the right to print.177
The significance of the Statute of Anne was that authors, who were
never recognized as having exclusive rights to print their own works,
were suddenly vested with ownership of their books and protected
against unauthorized printings of their work.
Despite this statute, Patterson appears to downplay the impor-
tance of legislative recognition of the role of the author in encouraging
learning.178 Patterson instead argues that the Statute of Anne was
never intended to benefit authors; rather, he argues that it was a trade
regulation to manage the book industry.179 Even with express statutory
language protecting the author, Patterson and other copyright scholars
have argued that the Statute of Anne did not provide credence to the
author as an individual with rights in his creation.180 Rather, they tend
176. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 states:
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently
taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing, or causing to be
printed, reprinted, and published, books and other writings, without the
consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, to their
very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families:
for preventing therefore such practices for the future, and for the encour-
agement of learned men to compose and write useful books . . . the au-
thor of any book or books printed . . . or bookseller . . . printer . . . or
other person who hath purchased or acquired the copy or copies of any
book or books in order to print or reprint [them], shall have the sole right
and liberty of printing such book and books for the term of one and
twenty years.
(emphasis added).
177. The Crown’s interest in censorship of the printing press led to the passing of
several Licensing Acts that allowed the Crown to monitor prints through the Sta-
tioner’s Company, and which gave the Stationer’s Company the exclusive right to
print books and pamphlets. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 143 (1968).
178. The preamble to the Statute of Anne calls it an “act for the encouragement of
learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such
copies, during the times therein mentioned.” Statute of Anne, c. 19.
179. PATTERSON, supra note 177, at 143.
180. Augustine Birrell thought that the Statute of Anne, by including the author as a
copyright holder under statute, destroyed any common-law recognition of authors’
rights by the courts. He states that “there was a steady majority of judges in favour of
the view that but for the Statute of Anne, an author was entitled to perpetual copyright
in his published work.” AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND
HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 21–22 (1899). Benjamin Kaplan viewed the inclu-
sion of the author into the Statute as a tactical move by publishers to put forward
authors’ interests together with their own. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 8 (1966).
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to view the inclusion of the author into the Statute of Anne as an ill-
considered act of legislative intervention in response to intense public
dissatisfaction with the operations of the book trade. Patterson claims
the monopolies in the book trade were so entrenched that the only way
to break them up was to introduce the author as an independent right
holder into the Statute of Anne. In this way, “the author was used
primarily as a weapon against monopoly.”181
English scholar Mark Rose tells a slightly different story in Au-
thors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright. Rose observes a num-
ber of influential writers, such as Locke, Defoe and Addison, making
claims to authorial rights in their works and gaining parliamentary
prominence before the Statute of Anne.182 But Rose acknowledges
that even while the drafters of the Statute of Anne were “sympathetic”
to these claims, “the legislature drew back from making any statement
about authors having an ‘undoubted property’ in their writings.”183 As
it is unclear if Parliament included authors in the Statute of Anne to
implicitly recognize a fundamental authorial right or to grant them
newly recognized legal rights in their work,184 history is no more in-
structive in providing shape to the notion of the author.
Other scholars have argued that the author is a mere “ideologi-
cally charged concept”185 used in copyright law to mediate the “ten-
sion between access and ownership” that arises through the use of
creative works or to support the economic stakes that “copyright pro-
prietors” have in the distribution of the work as “commodities.”186
The concept of authorship provided these copyright proprietors some
justification for ownership and the right to exclusively control their
works.187
Meanwhile, a number of literary critics have advanced the
postmodern view that the author is a socially constructed metaphor
181. PATTERSON, supra note 177, at 147.
182. ROSE, supra note 133, at 32–48 (1993).
183. Id. at 48.
184. Id.
185. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ‘Author-
ship’, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 456.
186. Id. at 500–01.
187. Proponents of a perpetual copyright after the Statute of Anne, particularly book-
sellers who were used to having perpetual rights until the statute reduced the term to
21 years, relied on the author’s common-law right to argue that it was an underlying
right that was supplemented, rather than created, by statute. See PATTERSON, supra
note 177, at 152–79; ROSE, supra note 133, at 67–91. Compare Millar v. Taylor, 98
Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1769) (featuring a bookseller relying on the author’s right to
claim perpetual copyright outside the Statute of Anne) with Donaldson v. Beckett, 1
Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774) (presenting a similar case, except the bookseller’s claim
was unsuccessful).
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that supports individualism, the privatization of creative production,
and the commercialization of literary and artistic works,188 making the
notion of the author even more ambiguous in copyright law. To Ro-
land Barthes, the author is also a product of society: the author, who
“is always conceived of as the past of his own book,” is in “the same
relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child.”189 But
Barthes urges the literary critic to discard the view of the author as the
person from whom the work originated, arguing that a written work
can only be properly understood when it comes together for the reader
and not when it originates from an author.190 Hence, Barthes argues
that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the
Author.”191 Michel Foucault also believed the person of the author to
be irrelevant to literary criticism, noting that “the author has disap-
peared.”192 Instead of individualizing the author and linking him with
188. See generally Laura A. Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship,
Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378 (2005)
(borrowing from Foucault and Barthes to argue that the author’s chosen identity
serves as a trademark to prevent consumer confusion); Lior Zemer, The Copyright
Moment, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 247 (2006) (using scholarship on authorial construc-
tionism to argue that copyright law should protect all actors in the creative process);
Lionel Bently, R. v. The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 32
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 15–16 (2008) (arguing that the works of Woodmansee, Rose,
and others led some “to argue that it is the mythical figure of the romantic author that
has driven copyright expansion”); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy:
Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 506 (2007) (arguing
that current copyright laws are unable to accommodate the practices of borrowing,
copying and reuse of creative materials in the act of creativity because of “views of
cultural production that derive from Romantic author conceptions”); Carys J. Craig,
Reconstructing the Author-Self: Some Feminist Lessons for Copyright Law, 15 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 208 (2007) (referring to the works of Foucault,
Woodmansee, and Rose to argue that copyright law’s emphasis on the author obscures
the “communicative function of authorship”); ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL
LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 284 (1998) (“Rather than the Romantic expression
of an author—the literary work that embodies his unique personality—the
(post)modern text ‘has no other origin than language itself’.” (quoting Roland
Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 142, 146 (Stephen Heath
trans., 1977))). Coombe goes on to argue that the proliferation of information and
communication technology has resulted in “a steady expansion of the fields in which
authorship and new forms of cultural authority are claimed.” Id. at 285.
189. Barthes, supra note 188, at 145.
190. Id. at 148 (observing that “a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from
many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but
there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as
was hitherto said, the author. . . . [A] text’s unity lies not in its origins but in its
destination.”).
191. Id.
192. Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY,
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS 113, 121 (Donald F. Bouchard ed.,
1977).
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his text, Foucault saw the author as a function of discourse.193 He
states that the author’s function is to “characterize the existence, circu-
lation, and operation of certain discourses within a society.”194
By designating the employer or the commissioner of a work as
the author through the work-for-hire doctrine, any tangible conception
of the author is diminished further. If the author is a mere social con-
struct—as these postmodern theories suggest—the persona of the au-
thor carries little significance and need not attach to the actual creator
of the work nor to any real or natural person; it may be deemed on any
entity the law deems appropriate. A corporation, which has employees
working to produce creative works such as movies, software, or mu-
sic, is not the actual creator of the work. However, by satisfying the
right conditions for employment which generates employee creativity,
the law treats the employer as the author of the work. It would seem
therefore that if the law is able to deem authorship on someone other
than the true creator of a work, then the author is indeed nothing more
than a social construct in the postmodernist sense.
This is not the correct view of the author. Authors have always
been—and remain—the suppliers of creative works that publishers
purchase and distribute to the public.195 Even early publishing con-
tracts vested extensive property rights in the author beyond the pub-
lisher’s right to print the work. Even before the Statute of Anne was
passed to provide authors with legal interest in their work, the 1667
publication contract for Paradise Lost between John Milton and pub-
lisher Samuel Simmons contained a clause that allowed Milton to “de-
mand an accounting of sales at reasonable intervals.”196 This clause
suggests that Milton assumed a property right in the work separate
from the publisher’s assigned right to print. In essence, the author was
treated as the owner of the work and beneficiary of publisher sales; the
publisher assumed the role of trustee.197
193. Id. at 121–24.
194. Id. at 124.
195. Even as author’s rights were not explicitly recognized, publishers still sought
authors out and asked them for permission to publish their work. While publishers
paid for the right to print and distribute the work, the author still retained rights to
control any modifications to the work. Maureen A. O’Rourke, A Brief History of Au-
thor-Publisher Relations and the Outlook for the 21st Century, 50 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y 425, 429–30 (2003); see also Alina Ng, Literary Property and Copyright, 10
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 531 (2012) (reviewing historical evidence showing that
authors retained rights in their works after publication and distribution rights were
assigned to the publisher).
196. Peter Lindenbaum, Milton’s Contract, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439, 443
(1992).
197. Ng, supra note 195, at 534–35.
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Publishers in early American publishing also appeared to recog-
nize the unique role of the author as the supplier and owner of creative
works. Consider, for instance, the March 1868 contract between Ralph
Waldo Emerson and Ticknor and Fields (which later became Hough-
ton Mifflin Harcourt) for the publication of May-Day and Other
Pieces. This contract contained a clause granting Emerson the right to
control the contents of his manuscript. In particular, the contract re-
quired Emerson to provide stereotype plates of the work and authorize
the publication of any new editions. The publisher had no other right
than the right to print the work. Emerson also had the right to termi-
nate the contract anytime he chose; if he did so, all that was required
was that he purchased all remaining copies in Ticknor and Fields’ pos-
session at cost. Through these provisions, Ticknor and Fields seemed
to acknowledge Emerson’s distinct property right in the work beyond
the standard rights contained in ordinary contract terms.198
Furthermore, the author is not always the entrepreneur—some-
times the author is just the creator and author of the work, whose
interest in the publication and distribution of authentic expression can
easily become subsumed by the economic interest of his employer or
publisher/distributor.199 Professor Roberta Kwall, for example, has ar-
gued that the creative act is not always motivated by economic re-
wards. Creative production can spawn simply from the “desire for
challenge, personal satisfaction, or the creation of works with a partic-
ular meaning or significance for the author” rather than the “reaping
[of] economic reward.”200 Sometimes, human beings create because
there is an innate urge to create, not just because a market profit is in
the horizon. Case in point: As Kwall points out, children create be-
cause they want to.201 So too do creators who produce works without
the expectation or hope of reward such as the prehistoric man and his
cave drawings, an inmate on death row, or prisoners in Nazi death
camps.202 “Art made the worlds of these artists more comforting and
198. Id. at 535–36.
199. William Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 12
(2002) (noting that authors’-rights jurisdictions such as Germany and France do not
have copyright laws which are “mere pretexts for protecting the investment and en-
trepreneurial initiative of authors’ exploiting partners” and pointing out that copyright
laws “which derive their legal and moral force from the act of creativity” and which
protect an author’s rights are not the same as producer investment laws, which protect
commercial investments in merchandise production).
200. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension
of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1947 (2006).
201. Id. at 1949–50.
202. Id. at 1950.
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tolerable,” Kwall notes.203 For this reason, the satisfaction that indi-
viduals derive from free expression must not be lumped in with the
profit-driven interests of employers. The author’s expression should
be recognized as his own.
If we fail to recognize that deeming authorship through the work-
for-hire doctrine is useful only to circumvent the problem of transac-
tion costs, the important role of the author in launching and supporting
“lively cultural expressions” will also be overlooked.204 The author is
a unique contributor to cultural and political discourse. He provides a
unique perspective to democratic dialogue in civil society and must be
allowed to speak in his own voice and identity. He should not be
stripped of his identity and forced to hide behind the mask of an em-
ployer. As copyright law can be used to promote a civil democratic
society as Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel argued,205 creators of ex-
pressive works need to be recognized by copyright law for their own
authentic voices as authors of their work in civil discourses. The need
to hear these voices is even more important in nations transitioning to
more democratic forms of government.206 To promote their important
democratic function in civic engagement, authors should be given
every reasonable opportunity to assume their own identity and speak
from a position of empowerment. The work-for-hire doctrine, if used
without conscious acknowledgement of its role as a consolidator of
different ownership in a work, will obscure the identities of authors as
they express themselves in civil society through their creations.
B. The Alienation of Authorship
Deeming authorship on an author’s employer or the commis-
sioner of a creative work also raises a fundamental question about
whether a creator’s status as author of the work can be alienated. It
dubiously suggests that authors can reasonably be expected to contract
their status as a work’s creator as easily as one could contract the
provision of creative services to another.
203. Id.
204. See Cornish, supra note 199 (suggesting that author play a large role in literary
and artistic creativity).
205. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (“[C]opyright is in essence a state measure that uses market
institutions to enhance the democratic character of civil society” by “provid[ing] an
incentive for creative expression on a wide array of political, social, and aesthetic
issues” and “support[ing] a sector of creative and communicative activity that is rela-
tively free from reliance on state subsidy, elite patronage, and cultural hierarchy.”).
206. See John Mukum Mbaku, Copyright and Democratization in Africa, 7 BYU
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 51 (2011) (suggesting that copyright law can be used to help
transition Africa to a democratic form of governance).
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This proposition is refuted by the Berne Convention. Article 6bis
of the Berne Convention separates an author’s moral rights from his or
her economic rights, and provides for the retention of an author’s
moral rights even after the economic rights have been transferred to
someone else.207 Moral rights, unlike economic rights that protect a
copyright owner’s right to commercialize and make profit from the
sale and distribution of the work, protect an author’s personal interest
in the work such as the right to claim authorship (“paternity” right) or
to object to any form of unauthorized modification (“integrity” right).
Moral rights also include the rights to withdraw the work from public
circulation, publish the work, and prevent other “injuries to the au-
thor’s personality as embodied in the work.”208 The Berne Convention
actually treats moral rights protecting identity and integrity as being
inalienable of the author even while the rights to reproduce and dis-
tribute the work are transferrable and alienable. Some jurisdictions
parallel Berne’s vision of the author’s copyright as twofold, comprised
of economic rights to profit from the sale of rights to commercially
exploit the work on the market as separable from the more basic au-
thorial rights of integrity and paternity stemming from one’s status as
the author and creator of the work. These moral rights are still retained
by the author even after the economic rights to exploit the work have
been transferred to another.209
Berne’s approach to the retention of moral rights even after eco-
nomic rights have been transferred speaks to the normative value of
protecting the personality of the author. As the creator of the work, the
author has personal prerogative in deciding how the work will be per-
ceived by society.210 The separation of economic and moral rights and
the retention of moral rights after the transfer of economic rights re-
veal a normative stance that the author’s personality and integrity
207. Berne Convention, supra note 151, at 51 art. 6bis (“Independently of the au-
thor’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall
have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutila-
tion or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”).
208. RALPH C. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF AUTHORSHIP 769 (2002).
209. William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 506, 515
(1955); Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law
Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 207–08 (1994–1995); PAUL GOLD-
STEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 290–91 (2001)
(identifying France and Spain as authors’-rights countries that impose an absolute bar
on the transfer of moral rights and Germany, which allows the waiver of moral rights
only when it would be unjust not to).
210. Moral rights are concerned essentially with the author’s public reputation.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 209, at 285.
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should not be compromised just because he chooses to exploit the
work by assigning away various exclusive rights. If moral rights are
intended to protect the author’s “freedom, honor, and reputation,”
these rights—like the rights to life or liberty—should also be inaliena-
ble as a matter of moral, ethical, and practical propriety.211 Some ju-
risdictions in continental Europe that enforce strong moral rights view
the right of an author to control the publication and distribution of his
work as a form of civil liberty,212 thereby protecting an author’s per-
sonality in the way his life or freedom is protected.213 In this light, it
seems fair to wonder if the creator’s status as author of a work can be
alienated from his person and deemed on another.
Authorship can be viewed as among the individual rights or inter-
ests that cannot be alienated. Calebresi and Melamed’s well-known
categorization of rules regulating and protecting entitlements into
property, liability, and inalienable rules carves out a category of enti-
tlements that may be justifiably forbidden from market transfer, such
as when a transfer could produce significant costs to third parties or
when a transfer may amount to an affront to social morality.214 Being
an “author” of a creative work is central to one’s identity—an integral
part of who someone is—that is inseparable from a person. The word
“author” is more than a label the law puts on a designated entity; the
word “author” is so constitutive of who a person is—such as
“mother,” “husband,” “man,” or “woman” are constitutive of one’s
identity as a person—that alienating that identity and putting it on
another makes one a less complete person.215
The separation of two doctrinally distinct rights of an author in
Article 6bis of Berne may reflect an unspoken but general belief that
the personal rights of an author support his human flourishing on a
211. Strauss, supra note 209, at 515. Note, however, that many authors’-rights juris-
dictions allow moral rights to be expressly waived by the author even though the law
may state that they are inalienable, and thus, non-transferrable. See GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 209, at 291–92.
212. Civil-law jurisdictions with strong moral rights in continental Europe such as
France, Germany, and Italy have “sturdier roots in the author’s right tradition than in
the copyright tradition.” GOLDSTEIN, supra note 210, at 10.
213. Andreas Rahmatian, Non-Assignability of Authors’ Rights in Austria and Ger-
many and its Relation to the Concept of Creativity in Civil Law Jurisdictions Gener-
ally: A Comparison with U.K. Copyright Law, 5 ENT. L. REV. 95, 97 (2000).
214. Guido Calebresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111–15 (1972).
215. Thus a person’s character, moral beliefs, and personal experiences cannot be
extracted from one’s personality, commodified, and sold in the market. To think that
“the ‘same’ person remains when her moral commitments are subtracted . . . is to do
violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human.” Radin, supra note
14, at 1906.
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fundamental level and should not be detached from his person for the
sake of easing the commercialization of creative work.216 By deeming
authorship on someone other than the author without the realization
and express acknowledgement that the reason for doing so is to con-
centrate ownership rights to facilitate the licensing of creative works,
copyright law may have made the mistake of concluding that a per-
son’s identity as an author can be alienated without engaging in the
more fundamental inquiry of whether it should be alienable.
C. The Diminishment of Copyright’s Sine Qua Non
The doctrine of deemed authorship obscures the normative value
of the requirement of originality in the law and renders moot the Su-
preme Court’s proclamation that “the sine qua non of copyright is
originality.”217 Copyright law requires works to be original so that
first-ownership rights and exclusive rights to exploit the work can be
firmly established through copyright.218 While the law has modest ex-
pectations for the level of creativity that the author should put into
producing the work,219 and certainly does not require the author to
match the “etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet,”220 originality
still sets an appropriate benchmark for when property rights may be
first recognized in intellectual creations that are vulnerable to free-
riding upon distribution. The rule that a work must be original to an
author to be eligible for copyright protection also serves a practical
authentication function in the copyright market. By emphasizing the
relationship between author (as the person to whom the work owes its
origin) and the work (as the product of the author’s creativity) and
denying copyright protection to works that are unoriginal or mere cop-
ies of another work, the law is able to manage the circulation of origi-
nal and counterfeit, forged, or unauthentic works in the market and
216. For this reason, author’s-rights jurisdictions protect the author of works that are
able to bear the personality of the author such as intellectual works in the areas of
literature, music, the fine arts, and film. See Rahmatian, supra note 213, at 97.
217. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
218. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58–59 (The Supreme Court observed that some intel-
lectual creations such as engravings, paintings, and printings “embody the intellectual
conception of its author, in which there is novelty, invention, originality, and therefore
comes within the purpose of the constitution in securing its exclusive use or sale to its
author.”).
219. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely
low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade
quite easily, as they possess some creative spark ‘no matter how crude, humble or
obvious’ it might be. Originality does not satisfy novelty; a work may be original even
though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the
result of copying.”).
220. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
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provide the public with a legal criterion to authenticate the work, rec-
ognize its worth, and attach the appropriate market value to it.221
The low standard for originality effectively allows a producer of
essentially similar works to obtain their own copyright when there is a
variation—however slight—in the final product.222 Some copiers may
therefore be able to obtain new copyrights for themselves by simply
making minor, even inadvertent, changes to their copy.223 Other copi-
ers may copy originals and have reputations so acclaimed they com-
mand significantly high prices for their replicas because of their name
alone.224 Furthermore, the idea that authors are original creators has
also come under attack by literary scholars who have argued that cre-
ators of literary works are seldom original; authors and poets imitate
nature and other literary works all the time.225 As most literary and
artistic works are an imitation of things surrounding their creator, the
“creative” poet who sits down with a pencil and some blank paper and
eventually produces a new poem in a special act of creation ex nihilo
just does not exist; “[h]uman beings do not create in that way,” North-
rop Frye says.226 Copyright scholars have made a similar argument
about literary and artistic production.227 As creators are seldom origi-
221. See Deborah M. Hussey, The Sine Qua Non of Copyright, 51 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 763, 786–89 (2003–2004) (stating, for example, that authentic Rodin
sculptures that are cast under Rodin’s authority or the authority of his heir, the Musée
Rodin, are valued more in the international art market. In 1999, an authentic Rodin
Eve sculpture whose provenance can be verified was sold for $4.8 million at Chris-
tie’s New York but the same piece without a similar provenance may have only
fetched $500,000. Bronzes made closer to the artist’s lifetime are also worth more on
the art market).
222. See Alfred Bell v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951).
223. See id.
224. Hussey, supra note 221, at 790 (noting the high price the Rockefeller Collection
commands for exact replicas of Rodin pieces because of the “aura, or at least the spell,
of Rockefeller’s personality.”).
225. NORTHROP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM 95–96 (1990) (“[A]ny poem may be
examined, not only as an imitation of nature, but as an imitation of other poems.”).
226. Frye thus wrote to dispel the conception of the romantic author who produced
works ex nihilo; the idea that one could create a work without drawing from sources
around him was unacceptable. Just as discoveries in science attest to things that were
already “latent in the order of nature,” poems attest to things that were already “latent
in the order of words.” Id. at 97.
227. See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Al-
ternative Model of ‘Authorship’, 2004 BYU L. REV. 69, 71; Wendy Gordon, A Prop-
erty Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556 (1993); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 966 (1990); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 (1989).
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nal, these scholars argue, copyright’s insistence on originality as the
benchmark for allocating first ownership rights may be misplaced.228
Deeming authorship on someone other than the true creator of the
work further diminishes the value of originality in the copyright sys-
tem, as the law sends a public message that the provenance of a work
is irrelevant in how first ownership rights are allocated. The reality of
the market for literary and artistic works is that a work’s prove-
nance—the identity of its true creator—often matters to the purchas-
ing public, who may be willing to pay a much higher price for a work
that is original to a particular author or artist. For instance, an authen-
tic Rothko painting is capable of fetching $8.3 million, while the lia-
bility art galleries face for selling forgeries to art collectors have
involved millions of dollars.229 Likewise, the value of certain artwork
has been known to increase over 200 times after its pedigree has been
authenticated.230 The origins of a work and its connection to its human
creator are sometimes a significant determinant of a work’s commer-
cial value. By deeming authorship on someone other than the true cre-
ator, the law undermines its  requirement that works be original for
copyright protection by letting non-authors represent themselves to be
the originator of a work, thereby thwarting expressed public prefer-
ences and value for original and authentic works.
Implicit in the law’s requirement of originality is that the work be
authentic to its creator; in other words, that it really and truly proceeds
from its identified authorial or artistic source.231 This implicit mean-
ing of originality does not fault authors for borrowing or imitating
others, but rather underscores that what is more important for the re-
quirement of originality is the practical realization that the work be
228. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV.
1505 (2009) (proposing that an author’s level of protection in copyright law be cali-
brated to the level of originality in his works); Ryan Litterell, Toward A Stricter Orig-
inality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2002) (calling for a stricter
standard of originality to maintain a robust public domain for future creativity); Russ
VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1993) (proposing
principles to analyze whether a work is original).
229. Patricia Cohen, 2nd Suit Accuses Gallery of Selling Fake Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/nyregion/knoedler-gallery-is-accused-
of-selling-fake-rothko-painting.html?_r=0 (describing a $25 million lawsuit against
the art gallery Knoedler & Company for selling a fake Rothko painting).
230. See Douglas Birch, $40 Sketch Could Be a $9,000 Utrillo: Did Baltimorean Hit
the Jackpot?, BALT. SUN, July 27, 1992, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-07-27/
news/1992209059_1_pencil-sketch-utrillo-salinger (describing how a painting bought
for $40 was valued at between $7,000 and $9,000 once a drawing specialist declared it
to be an authentic sketch of the French artist Maurice Utrillo).
231. Hussey, supra note 221, at 770 (defining originality as “proceeding immediately
from its source” and authenticity as “really proceeding from its source”).
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authentically the author’s.232 The work-for-hire doctrine has the po-
tential to obscure a reality that the law’s requirement of originality not
only allocates first ownership rights through an appropriate bench-
mark; originality also allows the law to conform to social expectations
that authentic works would be more valuable on the market. Without
the realization that some legal fictions may be necessary to ease the
application of the law, this reality that authenticated works are com-
mercially more valuable on the market may be concealed by the fic-
tion that a work’s provenance and true origins can be set aside for the
entity deemed into the place of the true creator.
CONCLUSION
The creator of literary and artistic works is the ethical foundation
of the copyright system. As individuals, authors and artists make the
most important contributions to the global repository of human knowl-
edge. Our culture is a product of human activity and developed by
human effort.233 So too is our experience of the world. Human cre-
ators contribute to that experience. The copyright system must protect
the human creator in his unique role in advancing society, art, and
culture. The copyright system may then effectively promote the pro-
gress of science through the authentic writings of authors.
The irony of copyright law is that, without even realizing it, it
sometimes devalues the very individual who is capable of making the
most significant contributions towards its institutional aim. Through
the concept of deemed authorship, the law mystifies the person of the
author, alienates his identity, and diminishes his importance as the
person from whom the work originates. The law has yet to recognize
that each creator has a personal connection with their creations that
can be used to authenticate works in public circulation and encourage
more authentic forms of authorship, which may then support the ad-
vancement of knowledge and the progress of science over a prolonged
period.
A more specific definition of originality may be timely in the
United States to avoid the confusion that deemed authors are consid-
ered true authors in the eyes of the law even when the work originated
232. Frye acknowledges that a poet may not be original, but the value of his or her
work lies not in what he added on to his source but rather in what the poet passes on
to his readers. Thus Milton’s “Paradise Regained” as a poem may not have been
original in that much of its prose was borrowed from the Bible. But it was definitely
authentic to Milton, who passed on his own rhetoric to his readers. FRYE, supra note
225, at 95.
233. See generally ELIE MAYNARD ADAMS, THE METAPHYSICS OF SELF AND
WORLD: TOWARD A HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY 253 (1991).
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from an employee or a commissioned author or artist. We may want to
look toward the European Union, where a work is considered original
only if it is “the author’s own intellectual creation.”234 In contrast, the
U.S. definition of originality allows employers and commissioners of
works to step into the shoes of the author and hold themselves out as
the true creator of the work because the work originated from them
even if they did not create the work.235 The European definition of
originality would allow employers and commissioners to be owners of
copyright acquired from the true author and not “authors” possessing
initial ownership rights in the work because they by definition did not
create the work with their own intellect.
Despite these concerns, allocating first ownership with the em-
ployer or commissioner has its utility. Legal fictions—at least the
good ones that facilitate understanding about the law and its func-
tion—are sometimes indispensable to legal thinking. The work-for-
hire doctrine and the concept of deemed authorship may be useful if
they are applied with consciousness of their purpose: to combat pro-
hibitively high transaction costs which could prevent the transfer of
rights in creative works.236 Whether legal fictions are beneficial or
harmful ultimately depend on whether they serve as support structures
that make the language of the law more logical and accessible or as
blindfolds that deprive the scholar, the practitioner, and the public
from truly understanding the law and what it stands—or should right-
fully stand—for. The problems that come with the use of legal fictions
are real, and one must always recognize that the fiction is a deviation
from reality, even when many of us are so quick to attribute objective
truth to that fiction, a mere intellectual construct that allows thought to
“manipulate and elaborate what is given.”237 The “formal processes of
thought” and the “objective reality of external events” are not the
same thing.238 Forgetting that legal fictions are false pretenses will
cause problems to arise when we think that these fictions are real and
forget that they are actually “the creations of our own minds.”239
234. Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 ECR 1-6569, ¶¶37–39
(E.C.J.).
235. Under Supreme Court doctrine, a work is original if its components “are origi-
nal to the author,” which protects a wide variety of works as long as they originate
from an “author” even if that “author” did not create the work intellectually. See Feist,
499 U.S. at 348.
236. See generally Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1601 (1982) (discussing how transaction costs affect market transfers).
237. VAIHINGER, supra note 10, at 35.
238. Id.
239. FULLER, supra note 2, at 136.
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Not all legal fictions are indispensable. These conceits of our le-
gal imagination are only indispensable when they act as a stepping
stone towards a value that the law cannot easily attain, such as justice,
fairness, and due process. Sometimes, we need to rely on a metaphor
to help connect what we hope to achieve through the law with familiar
experiences. These fictions are necessary and indispensable because
there are no available alternatives to achieve the morally correct deci-
sion through law. When we admit that our assumptions are false, the
presence of the artifice becomes obvious and the truth about the issue
is revealed. Laws may then develop as necessary to match social ex-
pectations and fundamental reality.240 With deemed authorship, the le-
gal fiction may be necessary. But it is important to recognize that the
doctrine of deemed authorship consolidates first ownership rights, as
this will reveal the doctrine as a legal fiction that functions only as a
bridge to make the law functional. The fiction must not be used to a
point where the greater need to understand who the author is, the role
he plays, and the meaning of authorship in the copyright system is
obscured. As long as the fiction of the deemed author is used with
caution, there should be no fear of the danger Fuller warned of.
240. More rules consistent with donative intent, for example, developed to limit or
avoid the Rule Against Perpetuities and to effectuate the true intent of the donor de-
spite the invalidating fictions of lifetime fertility. Some states have relaxed the con-
straints of the rule for perpetual trusts to allow donors of gift to asset some control
over the future. See Robert H. Sitkoff and Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115
YALE L.J. 356 (2005). See also Leach, supra note 32, at 730 (advocating a wait-and-
see approach before invalidating a gift).
